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Abstract: 
In this project we want to analyse the possible correlation between the European Union and                             
Morocco’s violation of sub­Saharan immigrants’ human rights. We have used theory­testing                     
process­tracing to operationalise the theory of external Europeanisation to analyse how the EU                         
influence Morocco and thereby conclude if the EU has any influence on how Morocco treat the                               
sub­Saharan immigrants who try to cross Morocco to get into Europe. We have found that                             
Europeanisation has an effect on Morocco and the country is changing legislation to be more in                               
line with the ​acquis communautaire​. Morocco’s immigration policy has become more securitised                       
like the EU’s, but it has not been possible to make Morocco implement human right legislation                               
that protect the immigrants, maybe because of a lack of trying. 
Executive summary 
This project report seeks to investigate the relation between the European Union and Morocco in                             
terms of human rights of sub­Saharan immigrants. We initially had the expectation that the                           
concept of Europeanisation does not only influence policy, polity and politics of member states,                           
but that the concept has an external dimension. We thus expected Morocco to be influenced by                               
Europeanisation and that this influence is further possible to measure in how human rights of                             
sub­Saharan immigrants is being respected or violated. This led to the following research                         
question: 
Is the EU influence in Morocco a case of external Europeanisation, and what are the                             
implications for human rights of sub­Saharan immigrants in Morocco? 
We thus seek to tests whether the concept of external Europeanisation is present in Morocco and                               
how this potential relation influence on human rights of sub­Saharan immigrants. 
The first chapter of this report is the introduction to the project and the research area. Thousands                                 
of people try every year to cross the borders in the search for a better life in the European Union.                                       
The immigrants experience horrible situations with death and injury as a consequence of trying                           
to cross the borders between Morocco and Spain. We thus present our wonder of why violations                               
of human rights are taking place at the EU borders, even though there are close relations between                                 
the EU and the border countries and the base of the agreements are democratisation and respect                               
of human rights. 
In the second chapter we present this project's methodology, based on a neoliberal ontology and                             
neo­positivistic epistemology. We present the method of process­tracing and theory­testing, that                     
allows us to test the theoretical concept of external Europeanisation in the case of Morocco. The                               
data used in this project are official documents from the Union, outlining the agreements                           
between the EU and Morocco, reports from NGOs stating the conditions of the sub­Saharan                           
immigrants and articles reporting the political and social development. 
The third chapter is our theoretical review and presents our theoretical approach of                         
Europeanisation. We start by outlining the theoretical concept of Europeanisation and argue why                         
we believe we can transfer this concept to an external relation. We use the theory of Lavenex and                                   
Uçarer (2004) to understand the mechanisms that can lead to different types of policy adaptation                             
and transfer in third countries. The limitations of our theory are the limited attention to e.g.                               
international politics or moral pressures. However, we have chosen the theory as we wish to tests                               
the theoretical concept of external Europeanisation, not explaining all potential relations between                       
the EU and Morocco regarding human rights. 
The fourth chapter is our analysis where we test the theoretical concept of external                           
Europeanisation. The analysis is divided in four sections based on our operationalised                       
mechanism of external Europeanisation: 1) the type of association, 2) the policy compatibility, 3)                           
domestic opportunity structure, and 4) the costs of non­adaptation. Throughout the analysis we                         
have divided the four sections into policy transfer in general in Morocco and specifically on                             
immigration policy and human rights. 
At the of the chapter we discuss the implications for human rights of sub­Saharan immigrants in                               
Morocco that might be present due to Europeanisation of Moroccan policy. Thus, we open our                             
analysis up to the possible implications that could follow from our results of the tests of external                                 
Europeanisation of Morocco. 
We finally conclude that there has been a policy transfer from the EU to Morocco through                               
opportune conditionality, meaning that policy in transferred through agreements in the interests                       
of Morocco. Regarding immigration policies, we conclude that there has been a policy                         
adaptation through deliberate emulation, which indicates that Morocco has chosen to adapt to EU                           
policy despite no requirements to do so. We conclude that this adaption is due to the Moroccan                                 
interests in adapting securitisation policy, as EU immigration policy to a large extent is based on                               
securitisation. Thus we conclude that the relation between the EU and Morocco is a case of                               
external Europeanisation. Further, we conclude that the agreements between the EU and                       
Morocco is not implementing norms of human rights of sub­Saharan immigrants due to lack of                             
pressure from the EU on Morocco, despite the EU’s rhetoric of being a promoter of human rights                                 
through its actions and agreements. The implications of the external Europeanisation for                       
sub­Saharan immigrants is potentially worsening conditions and violation of human rights as the                         
EU fails to implement norms of human rights in Morocco despite an extensive Europeanisation                           
of Moroccan policies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 Research area 
Every year, thousands of people from sub-Saharan countries travel across Africa in order to 
avoid poverty, violence, and persecution in their own countries. Their goal is to enter the 
European Union and get a better life. In 2014, more than 276,000 immigrants made that journey 
and managed to enter, which was an increase of 170% in comparison with 2013 (Giuliani 2015). 
However, the path towards Europe is full of mortal dangers, threats, and perils. It is a journey 
that may last for months, even years, in extremely precarious conditions.  Hunger, thirst, and 
cold cause many people to die during this “journey of hope”. The lucky ones, who manage to 
reach the European Union’s neighbour countries as a final step before reaching their goal, still 
have to face difficult situations within these transit countries.  
According to reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the immigrants who 
reach these countries face constant discrimination and a systematic violation of their fundamental 
human rights. This is translated into assault, rape, and in some cases living conditions that 
borders on slavery. These people, who have already faced death and starvation, have to wait in 
areas close to the EU borders for an opportunity to cross; but they still do not feel safe (Amnesty 
International, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2014).  
The immigrant's struggle to find a job in the transit areas, in order to earn some money to survive 
and pay the last phase of their journey. However, countries such as Turkey, Libya, and Morocco 
do not have working asylum systems. Therefore, immigrants find themselves in the situation of 
working illegally and face destitution or exploitative conditions. They can even be subject of 
arbitrary and indefinite detention by the state and militias (Amnesty International, 2014: 25). 
Human Rights Watch documented several cases in which Moroccan police raided the makeshift 
camps where they usually live, beat the people who were there, stole their few personal 
belongings and set these places on fire before, eventually, proceeding with their expulsion 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014:1). 
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Amnesty International (2014: 20) has also documented push back practices by EU Member 
States’ and neighbour countries’ authorities to prevent migrants from entering the EU by forcing 
groups of people to go back to the country they were trying to leave.  
The EU has the following statement on its official webpage: 
“The European Union sees human rights as universal and indivisible. It actively promotes and 
defends them both within its borders and when engaging in relations with non-EU countries.” 
(EEAS, A) 
Generally, there is an extensive focus on the EU’s responsibility of ensuring human rights in 
member states as well as third countries, and outside the EU the Union has a strong engagement 
to take action to promote democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms (ibid). 
Given the rhetorical focus on human rights and identity of the EU plus the basis of the 
agreements on democratisation and respect for human rights with the neighbouring countries, we 
wonder how come this violation of human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants keep happening at 
the borders of the EU. 
With the purpose of examining this potential relation between the EU and human rights of sub-
Saharan immigrants, Morocco has been chosen as the case study of this project as inequality and 
discrimination of sub-Saharan immigrants can be found in the nation. It is also the only North 
African country that shares its borders with the European Union, and the country that receives 
the most funds from the European Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission, A). 
It is our belief that the EU, with its growing political and economic position, has a significant 
impact on the neighbouring countries, which has led to the following research question. 
1.2 Research question 
Is the EU influence in Morocco a case of external Europeanisation, and what are the 
implications for human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants in Morocco? 
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We want to analyse the potential external Europeanisation of immigration policy in Morocco and 
in order to do that we first have to determine how Moroccan policy in general is being 
Europeanised.  
We have two expectations about what is taking place in Morocco based on the theory of external 
Europeanisation and the relation of the European Union and Morocco. First is the expectation 
that “there is Europeanisation of Moroccan policy”. It is our presumption that with the close 
geographic proximity of Morocco and with the signing of the Association Agreement, there must 
be some amount of Europeanisation taking place, which will be the base of our investigation in 
our analysis. If Europeanisation is present in the country, then we want to see how it is affecting 
the conditions the immigrants are subjected to, so the second expectation is “Europeanisation of 
Moroccan policy is affecting human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants”. 
1.3 Context: Morocco, European Union and immigration 
Here follows a short introduction of the context of the research area of this project report, which 
forms the basis of the entire report. 
1.3.1 Morocco and Immigration 
Morocco has historically been a country of migration and transit, based on trade and home of 
nomad tribes. In the 20th century, it was a country of emigration. Moroccan immigrants used 
Spain as a transit country in their way to France. However, the situation changed in the 1990s 
when Spain and Morocco developed their economies and became both a receiving and transit 
country respectively (Kimball, 2007). 
For many decades, Morocco fostered emigration and clandestine entry was not considered a 
crime (de Haas, 2005; in Kimball 2007). However, this changed during the 1990s when King 
Hassan II decided to collaborate with Spain in the field of immigration. His son the current King 
Mohammed VI increased this collaboration. 
In 2003 a law was passed to foster and tighten border controls and to fight against transit 
immigration, and since then the issue has been perceived as a matter of national security 
changing the whole Moroccan perception of immigration (Sadiqi 2004). In 2013, small 
amendments rhetorically concerned with human rights were introduced (Debbarh 2013). 
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In addition, Morocco has been affected by the externalities produced by the tightening of the EU 
external border control. Mohamed Sebbar, the secretary general of CDNH (the National Council 
for Human Rights) highlighted the European meddling in Moroccan immigration policies during 
a conference in Marrakech in 2014. He stated that:  
“the inflow of the current migration towards Morocco is mainly due to economic reasons, 
political crises and conflicts in the countries of origin, as well as to the effects of the rigorous 
European policy of border control” (Morocco 2014a). 
These externalities have also been mentioned by NGOs such as GADEM and Justice Without 
Borders (2010). In 2012 there were more than 12,000 illegal immigrants in Morocco waiting to 
enter Europe (GADEM for Justice Without Borders, 2010). Moreover, in 2013 59.3% of all non-
EU citizens refused entry at the external borders of the EU were rejected at Spanish borders 
(Eurostat). Therefore, Morocco shares one of the most impermeable EU external border. And the 
more immigrants that cannot cross to Europe, the more immigrants stay in Morocco.  
1.3.2 EU-Morocco relations 
The European Union’s foreign relations are conducted by several European agencies, like the 
European External Action Service, the Council of Europe and the High representative of Union 
for Foreign Affairs, and Security Project. It does this by making bilateral agreements, guidelines 
and legislation, all with the goal of promoting:  
“stability, promoting human rights and democracy, seek to spread prosperity, and support the 
enforcement of the rule of law and good governance.” (EEAS, B). 
When the EEAS deals with countries neighbouring the EU, it does so through the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was developed in 2004 to prevent divergence between the 
EU and its neighbouring countries. This is mainly done through bilateral agreements between the 
EU and the individual countries. The EU offers, among other things, opportunities for trade, 
social policy, and security (EEAS, C). 
The ENP was reviewed between 2010-2011, making the focus on economic development and the 
promotion of democracy, by promising more lucrative agreements with countries that made more 
progress on democratic reforms (European Commission, B). 
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A EU-Morocco Association Agreement entered into force in 2000 replacing the 1976 Co-
operation Agreement. The agreement was made to foster political stability and economic 
development in Morocco. The economic aspects focus on the free movement of goods and 
services between the EU and Morocco, specifically import of agricultural products from 
Morocco. Social affairs and migration are also part of the agreement, including cooperation on 
fighting illegal immigration (EEAS, D). 
1.3.3 Criticism of Morocco’s treatment of sub-Saharan immigrants 
Morocco has been criticised for its treatment of sub-Saharan immigrants for many years. Doctors 
Without Borders started their work in Morocco in 1997 providing humanitarian assistance and 
medical aid to sub-Saharan immigrants. In 2005 they demanded they were given access to more 
than 1,000 immigrants (Doctors Without Borders). The immigrants were in need of food, water, 
and medical care but their whereabouts were unknown because the Moroccan authorities kept 
moving the immigrants. Doctors Without Borders stated: “The European Union should not be 
satisfied with only declarations of good intentions from the Moroccan government” (ibid). 
The New York Times reported in 2012 that illegal sub-Saharan immigrants in Morocco were 
assaulted, robbed and raped not only by civilians but also by the authorities. Gangs would do as 
they saw fit, because the police did not care about the immigrants. Some of the illegal 
immigrants settle in Morocco, but most of them seek to get into the EU. When the police catch 
immigrants, they are not sent back to their country of origin; instead they are imprisoned and 
abused (Alami 2012). 
In 2013, both Fox News and International Business Times reported similar stories. Both media 
reported murders and discrimination against the sub-Saharan immigrants, who are trying to reach 
the EU (Makhfi 2013; Ghosh 2013). The authorities did nothing to prevent it and the situation 
was so bad that Doctors Without Borders closed their office in Morocco in protest (AFP, 2013). 
Human Rights Watch reported in 2014 that there was evidence of systematic abuse and 
mistreatment of sub-Saharan immigrants in Morocco. Moroccan authorities raided and destroyed 
unofficial migrant camps, in some cases arrested the migrants and sent them to the border of 
Algeria, where they would order them to cross the border by foot. The immigrants received 
similar treatment from the Algerian border forces. It was also reported that the expulsion of 
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immigrants had ceased after the new policy on asylum and migration in September 2013, but the 
camps were still being raided and the migrants still abused (Human Rights Watch). 
African Arguments reported in 2014, after yet another murder of a sub-Saharan immigrant, that 
the authorities were still mistreating immigrants and deportations were still taking place despite 
the laws on the treatment of immigrants. Assaults took place daily and the police did nothing to 
prevent it. The article highlighted the cooperation between the EU and Morocco and the 
Moroccan statement that they would build a fence to prevent migrants from passing into Spain 
(African Arguments). 
1.3.4 Migration to the European Union 
The issue of migration has continuously been framed as a danger to Western societies. Western 
countries have faced rising poverty, racism, and other social problems, and migration has been 
framed as something that leads to higher unemployment and erosion of culture. It is accused of 
posing threats to the Western way of life (Huysmans 2000: 752). 
This has not always been the case. In the 1950’s and 1960’s immigration was encouraged and 
loosely regulated because there was high employment and a need for labour. It slowly changed in 
the late 1960’s and through the 1970’s with favourable social and economic legislation for the 
domestic workforce, but immigration continued to rise. What would later be coined as ‘Fortress 
Europe’ started in 1968 with the council regulation, that distinguished between the free 
movement of citizens from member states and the free movement of third-country nationals 
(Huysmans, 2000). In the 1980’s the issue changed from something connected to economic and 
social policies, to something connected to immigration and the issue was increasingly politicised 
(ibid). Migration was an issue that was discussed in intergovernmental policy networks e.g. 
Schengen, where countries were interested in developing a cooperative policy on migration. This 
was incorporated into the EU structure in the Treaty on European Union, where migration was 
part of intergovernmental regulation. In the Treaty of Amsterdam the issues of immigration, 
asylum, and refugees were communitirised (ibid). 
Migration was first related to security in the 1990 Schengen Convention, “which connects 
immigration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime and border control” (ibid: 756) and 
even though EU policies improved the process for asylum seekers they also reduced the chances 
to get asylum, because it was only possible to apply once, not in every country separately 
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(Huysmans, 2000). With the increase in securitisation migration has been viewed as a threat to 
domestic culture and the welfare state and by extension all of society (ibid).  
The internal market was also seen as a security issue, because not only could the free movement 
of workers, goods, and services be viewed as a threat to public order and the rule of law 
(Huysmans, 2000), but dishonest people could now also take advantage of the lack of control 
between the countries. It was therefore deemed necessary to strengthen the external borders of 
the EU to keep the countries safe. The internal market was thus also linked to border control and 
security. 
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CHAPTER 2 Methodology 
2.1 Philosophy of Science 
In order to analyse the case of this project, we find it useful to understand and discuss how all the 
elements of the reality that is being studied here are interconnected. We argue, that classical 
ontological perspectives regarding the international arena are relevant for establishing the 
framework of the project. 
One of the main ontologies is Realism, which is a state-centric perspective that describes the 
international arena as a place where the actors look for security and their only concern is their 
own survival, similar to the human nature (Morgenthau: 1978). Realism and the latter 
Neorealism is based on the idea that states belong to an anarchic world, meaning that there is no 
central authority and states search for power in a zero-sum game context in terms of 
development of military resources (Waltz, 1979). 
Nonetheless, having in regard the role of the European Union in this project and as a 
supranational actor in the international arena, a state-centric ontology as Neorealism is not able 
to describe the reality in which the case selected for this project takes place. We study the 
relation between the EU and Morocco, and how they are political interconnected, why we have 
the ontology closer to Neoliberalism, which is seen as a contrast to Neorealism. Thus, we do not 
believe in the zero-sum game of military power being central for the potential policy adaptation 
that we are searching for. 
Some of the more important authors of Neoliberalism are Keohane and Nye with their work of 
the concept of complex interdependence. They claim, “We live in an era of interdependence” 
(Keohane & Nye 2001: 3). Hence, modernisation has increased the level of interdependence 
between states, and transnational actors are increasingly important in the international system, 
thus, “a higher level of transnational relations between countries means a higher level of 
interdependence.” (Jackson & Sørensen 2013: 106). 
Interdependence liberals are however not as utopian as classical liberalism as they do not argue 
that complex interdependence means a world with no international conflicts (Keohane & Nye 
2001: 9). Still, military power is no longer the most important power resource: Other resources 
are of increasing importance in the interdependent system (Jackson & Sørensen 2013: 108), and 
the fear of being attacked is almost nonexistent (Keohane & Nye 2001: 23). 
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The general critique of complex interdependence is that financial flows between states are not a 
new phenomenon, and even though countries have been linked by economy for years, it still did 
not prevent the world wars (Ibid: 120). 
Taking all this into account, we argue that the relationship between Morocco and EU is complex 
as it is not just about security: economic and social issues are at stake. According to this 
ontology, the interdependent relations that exist between the actors influence the areas of 
economy and social issues: in this case, between the European Union and Morocco. Moreover, 
this ontology describes the reality, not with a state-centric approach, but with the possibility to 
understand the complexity of supranational actors and their relation with national states. 
Therefore, the ontology of neoliberalism and complex interdependence is used as the description 
of the reality throughout this project, as we argue that the relation between Morocco and the EU 
is based on various economic, political and social issues. 
The epistemology of our project is to deduct to what extent the EU influence Moroccan policy, 
why we seek to measure and test our theory on the reality. Thus, we work with a neopositivist 
epistemology, as we seek to put the reality into parts that we can study empirically through 
documents (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 11). As presented in the first chapter, we work with certain 
expectations that set the base for our analysis of the case, thus framing the study as “if X then Y 
with a certain probability” that we seek to validate (Juul & Pedersen 2012: 37). Though, we do 
not apply the classical positivistic testing of hypothesis and then validate or falsify it, but we are 
inspired by it. How we work with the relation between X and Y and the validation of the relation 
will be described in depth in section 2.3, Strategy for processing of empirical material: Process-
tracing. 
This neopositivist epistemology together with our neoliberal ontology thus frames the project 
and our methods. 
2.2 Presentation of data 
In order to test our research question we analyse written documents regarding the relations 
between Morocco and the European Union. We have chosen four clusters of documents: The 
first cluster groups official documents related to Moroccan policy and research made about this 
topic, including immigration. The second one contains all the official EU documents about its 
relation with Morocco found in the ENPI database that cover completely the official relation 
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between Morocco and the EU, such as association agreements, progress reports about the 
country, action plans, and ENP memos. The third group of documents that we use as empirical 
data for the analysis are reports made by NGOs about the situation of sub-Saharan immigrants in 
Morocco and the involvement of the Moroccan government and the EU. We thus seek to balance 
the data from the EU with reports from interests groups, such as Human Rights Watch and 
Justice Without Borders. The fourth cluster is composed of articles from scholars and media that 
provide different perspectives than the official documents.  
In annex 1 we outline the material we use in the analysis of the extent that Moroccan policy on 
human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants is influenced by the EU and whether it is a case of 
external Europeanisation or not. The tables in the annex present a timeline of the agreements and 
reports along with the main objective of each part of the EU-Morocco relation. Tables for NGOs 
documents and Articles can also be found in annex 1. 
2.3 Strategy for processing of empirical material: Process-tracing 
We seek to study the potential Europeanisation of Moroccan immigration policy and to what 
extent it influences human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants, and due to our neo-positivistic 
epistemology, we study this relation through documents regarding the reality we seek to 
investigate and we put this reality into parts to be studied. This approach leads us to a method of 
analysing the causal relationship between two parts: the EU and human rights of sub-Saharan 
immigrants, to see if it is external Europeanisation that influences this relation. We thus use the 
method of process-tracing to investigate the relation between the EU and human rights of sub-
Saharan immigrants as process-tracing is a tool to study the causal mechanisms that make X 
cause Y in a case study (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 2). In our project the X is the European Union 
and the Y is human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants based on our expectations. 
Process-tracing in social sciences can be divided into three different types; theory-testing, 
theory-building and explaining-outcome. The type of process-tracing we pick has consequences 
on the methods used in the research and it is therefore important to be aware of what we want to 
do and how we then do it. 
Theory-building is about building a theoretical explanation of the causal mechanisms and the 
outcome they cause. Explaining-outcome seeks to create an explanation of the outcome of a case 
and the mechanisms that caused it. Theory-testing is about testing a theory in a specific case. 
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One first deduces a theory and then test if the mechanisms that are part of it are present in a 
specific case and if they functioned as expected. This method can test if the hypothesized 
mechanisms were present in a case, but not if it was the sole mechanism that caused the 
observable outcome (ibid: 3). 
We expect external Europeanisation to be causing EU influence in Moroccan policymaking, and 
that is why we believe the theory-testing version of process-tracing for the analysis can help us 
test if the mechanisms of external Europeanisation are present and influences human rights of 
sub-Saharan immigrants in Morocco. Thus, we wish to test if external Europeanisation is present, 
as we expect this to influence on human rights, not if external Europeanisation is the sole 
mechanism of Moroccan policymaking and human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants.  
In theory-testing we expect that a specific causal mechanism (Europeanisation) is present in a 
number of different cases and we select one case where both X and Y are present and where the 
context allow the mechanism to function (ibid: 11). The idea is to analyse whether the 
mechanism was present and if it linked X and Y in the theorised manner. We thus expect that 
external Europeanisation causes EU to influence on human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants in 
different cases of neighbourhood countries, and we have chosen the case of Morocco, as we in 
this case see violation of human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants. We then want to analyse this 
mechanism further, to tests our expectations and establish whether or not this causal relation is 
valid. 
To do theory-testing we must first 1) conceptualise the causal mechanism based on existing 
theory, 2) select a case, 3) operationalise the empirical tests, and finally 4) evaluate on the 
empirical material (ibid: 14): 
1) We base our conceptualisation of the causal mechanism between X (the EU) and Y (human rights 
of sub-Saharan immigrants) on the theory of external Europeanisation by Lavenex and Uçarer. 
Thus, the causal mechanism between X and Y is based on the context of types of associations, 
policy compatibility, domestic opportunity structure, and cost of non-adaptation (Lavenex and 
Uçarer 2004: 418). The theory will be explained in depth in the following chapter. 
2) We then pick the case of Morocco, as explained in the section 2.5. 
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3) The theorised causal mechanism then need to be operationalised into expectations and predictions 
for the case of Morocco. We operationalised the causal mechanism into the four mechanisms 
from the theory of Lavenex and Uçarer (2004) and the following predictions, which we believe 
are evidence for these mechanisms: 
-    Type of association 
o   Formal agreements 
o   Binding/ not binding requirements 
-    Policy compatibility 
o   Change of policy 
o   Similarities/differences in policy 
-    Domestic opportunity structure 
o   The King and the political system 
o   Economy and trade 
o   Democratisation/Arab spring 
o   Social change 
-    Cost of non-adaptation 
o   Rewards/Sanctions 
o   Integration with the EU 
o   Transfer of resources 
4) Once the mechanism and context are conceptualised and operationalised, we collect empirical 
evidence on the causal relations of EU, Morocco, and human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants 
to argue: “1) whether the hypothesised mechanism was present in the case and 2) whether the 
mechanism functioned as predicted or only some parts of the mechanism were present” (Beach 
& Pedersen, 2013: 14). The predictions of evidence are used to code all data, so we can 
distinguish between the different mechanisms. 
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The methods described here seek to go beyond the basic notion of correlation between X and Y, 
and try to “peer into the box of causality to locate the intermediate factors lying between some 
structural cause and its purported effect” (ibid: 2). The causal mechanisms are fundamental in 
the study of a single case study method ibid: 3) and in our case e.g. the congruence method 
would not work as the congruence method only focuses on the presence of the correlation 
between X and Y, and thus would limit our search possibilities (ibid: 4). 
2.4 Theoretical approach and limitations 
This project is based in our interest in testing if the relation between the European Union and a 
third country such as Morocco, which shares borders with the EU but does not expect to become 
a member1, can be considered a usual bilateral relation between two actors within the 
international arena or if the nature of the EU as an international actor leads to a different kind of 
relation/influence, which can be considered Europeanisation. 
In order to answer this question, we decided to follow the idea of Radaelli (2003), who states that 
the first step to approach this is by theorising what Europeanisation is in order to define it 
accordingly to what is going to be analysed and we decided to use the Ladrech (2010) 
perspective of what Europeanisation is regarding dimension, mechanisms, and outcomes. 
Once we know what Europeanisation is, we approach external Europeanisation in the same way 
as scholars have worked with Europeanisation outside the European Union. Special focus is 
placed on the theory of Lavenex and Uçarer (2004) who create a framework that can be applied 
to any country in the world when looking for any adaptation due to Europeanisation and they 
based their research on immigration policy. 
We know that this research is still very new and little developed, and many critics say that this is 
because there is no external Europeanisation as such. However, we wish to investigate this 
poorly developed theoretical approach to Europeanisation in that we believe that external 
Europeanisation does take place in Morocco, why we seek to test and thus prove or rule out the 
statement of external Europeanisation in the case of Morocco as an influence of the human rights 
of sub-Saharan immigrants. 
                                                
1 Morocco already applied for membership in 1987, but its application was rejected because the European Union 
considered that Morocco was clearly not part of Europe (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 52) 
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When analysing the implications that the EU might have on sub-Saharan immigrants’ human 
rights in Morocco, global factors have an influence. In many cases global issues are the dominant 
factor for change, and institutions such as the United Nations or the Maghreb Union could be 
argued to have a greater impact on the immigration policy and human rights of sub-Saharan 
immigrants than the EU in terms of human rights conventions along with general migration 
patterns and social and economic issues within Africa. The same can be said regarding 
international power structures as well as moral pressures from the media, civil society, and 
interests groups. These structures are not included in the theory of Lavenex and Uçarer and we 
could argue that these are significant limitations to our analysis. To include these dimensions and 
structures, we could have decided to incorporate theory-building as an extension to the theory-
testing, to expand on the theory by Lavenex and Uçarer and thus get the full picture on Moroccan 
policymaking and human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants in Morocco.  
However, in this project we wish to tests the theoretical concept of external Europeanisation, and 
that is why we have not included and analysed global and domestic influences along with moral 
pressures. We do recognize the limitations of understanding the EU’s impacts of human rights of 
sub-Saharan immigrants by not including these factors in the analysis, however we believe that 
these dimensions does not contribute to the testing of the theoretical concept of external 
Europeanisation. Nevertheless, we do seek to incorporate these dimensions in the final 
discussion, following our test of the theoretical concept on our case. Thus, we do not seek to 
expand the concept of external Europeanisation, why we keep to the concept in the testing of 
external Europeanisation of Morocco, and then wait with the introduction of these structures 
when we discuss our expectations of how EU influences human rights in third countries.  
2.5 Methodological reflections 
We are looking specifically for external Europeanisation because we are interested in whether 
this kind of influence is affecting a third country such as Morocco. We have chosen the policy 
area of migration for two reasons. The first one is because we wonder whether this influence 
goes beyond economy. The second reason is current affairs such as the drowning of thousands of 
migrants in the Mediterranean Sea, which makes this topic currently relevant in expanding our 
understanding of how the EU is related to these tragic events.  
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We have chosen this country among all the transit countries for immigrants in the North of 
Africa because of its government stability when comparing with the rest of the countries in this 
area, which removes the problem of domestic instability distorting the observable evidence. It 
also enable us to analyse the country as a single actor, that has barely changed over time, or if 
there has been minor changes to the country, then take those changes into consideration. Only 
Morocco and Algeria have had the same government regime in the last fifteen years. Tunisia, 
Libya and Egypt have suffered profound changes regarding their governments, which have led to 
some periods of instability that still affects some areas. When choosing between Morocco and 
Algeria, we decided to pick the country that share land borders with Spain and by extension, the 
European Union. We have done this because we think immigrants crossing the border by land 
are an issue for the EU that is easier to prevent, than immigrants crossing by sea. Lavenex and 
Uçarer (2004) also note that it is interesting, the association between the EU and third countries 
has some correlation with the geographical distance from the EU, reaffirming the choice of 
Morocco over Algeria. 
We would like to figure out whether there is any influence and if this influence can be 
considered Europeanisation, so we do not want to rule out any other possible explanations. That 
is why we have chosen process-tracing as our method, as this is just one test of valid 
mechanisms, without excluding the possibility of other factors to have an influence. 
Our analysis is based on politicised published data from especially formal institutions, only 
challenged by interests organizations’ data. Both forms of data are heavily politicised, why our 
analysis will be affected in terms of political implications. To balance this, it would have been 
beneficial to support the data with inside knowledge, portraying the line of thought behind the 
documents and not just the communications on the matter. However, such data is based on the 
assumption that there is an ulterior motivation behind any kind of agreement between the EU and 
Morocco that is not evident in the published material. We do not make that assumption, however 
we do take the political side to all data into consideration. 
The high politicisation of the topic is the reason why in the project only written documents are 
analysed and we do not make use of interviews. This decision was made because we did not 
expect to receive anything but the official version already published in the reports when 
interviewing relevant people from the Moroccan government and the EU in this policy area. We 
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also did not expect that the version of the NGOs about the facts described in their reports were 
presented in a different way, when interviewing their personnel. 
2.6 Structure of analysis and discussion 
Our analysis and discussion of the EU influence in Morocco as a case of external 
Europeanisation, and what the implications for human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants in 
Morocco are is structured according to our epistemology and methodology. Thus, we structure 
our analysis around the mechanisms that we have operationalised: the first part of the analysis 
will be an analysis of the type of associations between EU and Morocco, the second part will be 
about policy compatibility, the third part about domestic opportunity structures, and the fourth 
part about cost of non-adaptation of policy. This allow us to follow the mechanism of the 
theoretical concept of external Europeanisation by Lavenex and Uçarer (2004) testing whether 
evidence indicates that each part of the mechanism is present (Beach & Pedersen: 2013: 14). By 
analysing the operationalised mechanisms we can conclude the type of transfer mode and thus 
conclude on whether or not there is external Europeanisation in Morocco, and to which extent.  
After the conclusion of whether there is any type of transfer mode, we discuss the implications 
for human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants in Morocco.  
2.7 Structure of the project report 
The first chapter of this report is the introduction to the project and the research area. Here we 
have outlined the issue and how we expect the relation between EU and Morocco to be and how 
it is related to human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants. We have presented our wonder of why 
violations of human rights are taking place at the EU borders, even though there are close 
relations between these countries and the base of the agreements are democratisation and respect 
of human rights. 
In the second chapter we have presented this project's methodology, with focus on the neoliberal 
ontology and the neo-positivistic epistemology. We present the used method of process-tracing 
and theory-testing, that allows us to test the theoretical concept of external Europeanisation. In 
this chapter we further present the data, the theoretical approach and the limitations, the 
methodological reflections, and the structure of the analysis and discussion. 
The third chapter is our theoretical review and presents our theoretical approach of 
Europeanisation. We start by outlining the theoretical concept of Europeanisation and argue why 
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we believe we can transfer this concept to an external relation. We use the theory of Lavenex and 
Uçarer (2004) to understand the mechanisms of external forms and mechanisms that can lead to 
different types of policy adaptation in third countries. The model of dimension and forms of 
external effects by Lavenex and Uçarer (2004) is the basis of our analysis of the policy transfer 
from EU to Morocco. 
The fourth chapter is our analysis where we test the theoretical concept of external 
Europeanisation. As mentioned, the analysis is divided in four sections based on the 
operationalised mechanisms of external Europeanisation: 1) the type of association, 2) the policy 
compatibility, 3) domestic opportunity structure, and 4) the costs of non-adaptation. At the end 
of the analysis we are thus able to conclude on the mode of transfer that has happened in 
Morocco. Throughout the analysis we have divided the four sections into policy transfer in 
general in Morocco and specifically on immigration and human rights. Thus, we end up 
concluding a mode of policy transfer on general Moroccan policy and a mode of policy transfer 
on immigration and human rights. At the end of chapter four, we discuss the second part of our 
research question in that we seek to discuss the implications for human rights of sub-Saharan 
immigrants in Morocco that might be present due to the Europeanisation of Moroccan policy. 
Thus, we open our analysis up to the possible implications that could follow from our results of 
the tests of external Europeanisation of Morocco. 
The last chapter is our conclusion, where we present our findings of external Europeanisation of 
Moroccan policy based on our methodological and theoretical discussion and conclusions.  
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CHAPTER 3 Europeanisation and its external dimension 
 
It is crucial when using concepts like Europeanisation that it is clear what the concept means to 
avoid confusion. This is especially important with Europeanisation, because it can have very 
different meanings and the concept is heavily debated (Ladrech 2010). As Radaelli (2003) 
explains, Europeanisation has suffered of concept stretching for a long time and this is something 
we want to avoid in this project. 
In order to do so, we first place our attention to the definition of Radaelli (2003) who is the one 
who points out the problem of concept stretching and then offers a definition in order to not 
repeat the same mistake: 
“Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal 
rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms 
which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic institutions, identities, political structures, and public 
policies” (Radaelli 2003: 30). 
In this definition the concept of Europeanization is portrayed as a process and not only as an 
outcome. It is also relevant for this project that Radaelli does not specify that the Europeanisation 
of “(...) domestic institutions, identities, political structures and public policies (...)” is 
exclusively relevant for the member states. 
Following the idea of Europeanisation as a process, Ladrech (2010) specifies that there are three 
fundamental questions to be answered in Europeanisation research: dimension, mechanism, and 
outcome. In this project, we consider that the dimension is the case, which is immigration policy 
in Morocco and more specifically human rights of illegal immigrants in the country. The 
mechanisms are how the EU influences the dimension and we are aware of the possibility that 
there can be several mechanisms that can work interconnected (Knill and lehmkuhl, 2002). The 
outcome is the effect caused by the mechanisms employed by the EU. 
Having all of this in regard, we understand Europeanisation as the influence on one or more of 
the areas of policy, politics, and polity at either the EU level or the domestic level. This is 
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because we do not understand Europeanisation only as a top-down (downloading) process, but 
also as bottom-up (uploading). Member states try to influence decision-making at the EU level, 
so they do not have to comply with a policy that contradicts their own policies or because it is in 
their best interest to have an issue dealt with at the EU level. 
The EU level can be influenced by member states uploading their domestic policies to get them 
incorporated into the EU system, as well as pressures from the EU level can cause changes at the 
domestic level. This process of uploading and downloading is a common understanding of 
Europeanisation used by EU scholars. EU influence in terms of downloading does however not 
necessarily lead to alignment with or implementation of EU policies; it can also lead to 
divergence or retrenchment (Radaelli, 2003). 
Finally, the use of fit/misfit as a process of Europeanisation is a much used, however contested, 
concept. The degree of misfit between national structures of one member state and the European 
level leads to a top-down pressure. This pressure provokes changes in the national level as the 
member state tries to adapt (Ladrech, 2010). 
However, critics point to the difficulties of determining whether changes in policies are due to 
misfit between domestic and EU policies, or if the changes would have happened anyway due to 
internal or global pressures (ibid: 33). The theory of fit / misfit in Europeanisation theory is still a 
basic understanding of how and why member states adapt to EU policies. It is too focused on 
institutional constraints and loses the possibility of taking informal politics and the absence of 
adaptive pressures into account (Woll and Jacquot, 2010). 
3.1 External Europeanisation 
In this section, we intend to present and discuss the external dimension of Europeanisation, as it 
will be the theoretical base of our analysis. 
First, the very idea of the existence of Europeanisation beyond the European Union and its 
member states will be discussed. Second, a review of the main theoretical perspectives in the 
literature about external Europeanisation will be presented. Finally, we will explain the 
theoretical approach we have chosen for this project. 
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3.1.1 Europeanisation and third countries 
Europeanisation literature has often been focused on what happens within the Union and its 
member states (Schimmelfennig, 2009), but also whether it is valid to ask if the EU’s influence 
on third countries can also be considered Europeanisation. In order to answer this question, it is 
necessary to look at the definition of Europeanisation and find out if the European Union has an 
influence that leads to an outcome, through several mechanisms in a given dimension in a non-
member state. Is there a transfer to third countries of the European Union’s acquis 
communautaire through this process? 
There is a growing literature about the effects of the EU in third countries’ polity, politics, and 
policy, still this is not labelled Europeanisation, but as research about the global position of the 
EU as an international actor and the focus is on foreign and security policy rather than if and how 
the EU affects third countries (ibid: 5-6). Moreover, this research mainly studies the impact of 
the EU in the international arena and system, but it does rarely pay attention to its domestic 
impact in third countries. 
The literature that actually does explore the effect of the EU and its domestic impact in third 
countries identify a series of goals based on the thesis of a “domestic analogy”, which point out 
that polities like to face mirrored systems (Schimmelfennig: 2009). These identified goals are: 
● Promotion of its model of regionalism based on regional economic and market 
integration and the creation of supranational organizations - e.g. African Union, 
MERCOSUR - which is evident by its tendency to sign agreements with regional groups 
of countries instead of individually (Bicchi, 2006; Farrell 2007; cited in Schimmelfennig, 
2009). 
● Propagation of a neoliberal economic model (Hurt, 2003; cited in Schimmelfennig, 
2009). Still, other authors defend that the EU tries to transfer a “regulatory model for 
liberal markets” (Grugel, 2004; Woolcock, 2005; cited in Schimmelfennig, 2009). 
● Transfer of constitutional norms as human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. 
According to Crawford (2005; cited in Schimmelfennig, 2009), this transfer is more 
limited than when looking at the economic model and it is better defined as a democracy 
assistance agenda for third countries.  
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In order to reach these outcomes, that can be present in any type of policy transfer, the EU puts 
in motion a series of mechanisms of policy transfer that several theoretical perspectives have 
identified when studying different dimensions of policy areas. When taking into account, first, 
the fact that the literature of external Europeanisation has identified these elements and, second, 
the definition of Europeanisation presented in the previous section, we argue that the EU’s 
influence on third countries also can be considered Europeanisation. 
3.1.2 Theoretical perspectives of external Europeanisation 
In this section, we will explain the mechanisms identified by the different theoretical 
perspectives of external Europeanisation. The dimensions from which these theoretical 
approaches emanate will also be pointed out. 
In the literature of external Europeanisation there are four main perspectives in regard to 
mechanisms (Schimmelfennig, 2009): 
First perspective: Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004; cited in Schimmelfennig, 2009) 
analysed the process of Europeanisation regarding accession countries to the EU and divided the 
mechanisms that they identified according to two dimensions. In the first one, the process of 
Europeanization can be driven by the European Union, but also the third countries can drive it 
domestically. The second dimension is one of institutional logics, where they identify the “logic 
of consequences” and the “logics of appropriateness”. The former presents an external incentive 
model, where Europeanisation depends on sanctions and rewards for the third countries. In the 
latter, Europeanisation happens through “social learning” (Schimmelfennig, 2009). 
Second perspective: Diez, Stetter and Albert (2006) focus their research on the influence of 
European Union on border conflicts and describe what they call the four “pathways of EU 
impact” (Diez, Stetter and Albert 2006; cited in Schimmelfennig, 2009: 7). The pathways are 
classified according to two variables. The first variable is whether the impact is due to any 
concrete measure of the EU or if it is an indirect effect of the European process of integration. 
The second variable is whether the impact of the EU is by concrete measures or if it has wider 
social consequences for the third country. Diez, Stetter and Albert (2006; cited in 
Schimmelfennig, 2009) thus identify and name the four pathways: (1) the “compulsory impact” 
is the one influenced by concrete EU measures and the impact also hits the third country’s 
concrete measures; (2) the “connective impact” is influenced by concrete measures, but it has 
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broader implications as it helps to connect conflicting parties; (3) the “enabling impact” is due to 
an indirect EU influence and make conflicting actors to strengthen themselves by following the 
EU agenda; and (4) the “constructive impact” is due to the indirect influence of being exposed to 
the European integration that leads to a reconstruction of identities (Diez, Stetter and Albert, 
2006: 572-574). 
Third perspective: Bauer, Knill and Pitschel (2007; cited in Schimmelfennig, 2009) analyse 
domestic change in Central and Eastern Europe, basing their model on EU governance modes in 
regulatory policy: compliance, competition, and communication. Compliance is a coercive 
mechanism of positive integration due to the binding rules that states implement to not be 
sanctioned. Competition is a mechanism of market pressures that leads to negative integration 
where states need to improve their institutional arrangements in comparison to member states. 
Communication is a mechanism of voluntary information exchange and mutual learning (Bauer, 
Knill and Pitschel 2007; cited in Schimmelfennig, 2009). 
Fourth perspective: Finally, Lavenex and Uçarer (2004) study external Europeanisation in the 
dimension of immigration policy and identify different modes of third countries’ policy 
adaptation. Special attention will be placed in this theoretical approach in the next section of this 
chapter since this theory focuses on our policy of interest: immigration policy. 
We chose to base our analysis on Lavenex and Uçarer’s theories of Europeanisation, as we 
believe they encompass the core of external Europeanisation and create a framework which 
works when one wants to test whether Europeanisation is present in a country, whereas the other 
three theories only focus in (1) pre-accession countries, (2) countries exposed to European 
integration, and (3) Central and Eastern European countries. 
Further, their model of the different dynamics and forms of external effects allows us to keep and 
discuss some of the original concepts of Europeanisation such as fit/misfit in our analysis. Most 
importantly is the way Lavenex and Uçarer categorise third countries’ associations to EU, which 
allows us to work specifically with the politics of ENP and the relations between EU and 
Morocco. 
Thus, the following sections is a presentation of the dynamics of External Europeanisation as 
presented by Lavenex and Uçarer, which will be this project’s understanding of external 
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Europeanisation and thus what is our understanding, when we analyse if the EU influence in 
Morocco is a case of external Europeanisation.      
3.1.3 External Europeanisation in the area of immigration policy 
Lavenex and Uçarer analyse how EU policies develop an external dimension that affects non-
member states. They identify four ways in which this external dimension is developed: (1) The 
policies become a subject in international negotiations where the Commission acts on behalf of 
the EU and its members (O’Keefe, 1996; cited in Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004); (2) the common 
policies lead to unintended externalities on third countries; (3) the EU purposefully exports its 
policies through agreements with third countries; and (4) the European policies are extended to 
third countries through institutionalized forms of cooperation (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004: 418). 
The external dimension of the EU policies has an impact on third countries’ policies as in many 
occasions these countries adapt their own legislation when facing European pressures. This is 
what Lavenex and Uçarer (2004) understand as a process of policy transfer. There are two types 
of policy transfer: Obligated/coerced transfer, which is usually a vertical top-down binding 
process; and voluntary transfer that can be defined as horizontal adaptation due to bottom-up 
processes (ibid: 420). 
Based on this classification, Lavenex and Uçarer (2004) go further in detail and identify four 
mechanisms of policy adaptation when looking at migration policies and the external impact of 
the European Union: 
1. Unilateral policy emulation: Third countries align with EU policies because of domestic 
interests or because they see EU policies as more efficient solutions for existing problems 
within their territories. 
2. Negative externalities: Third countries align with EU policies because the cost of not 
doing so is higher than if they align. This is usually a response to externalities of EU 
policies. The example used by the authors to explain this is a potential rise of asylum 
seekers in third countries if the EU enforces tighter controls. 
3. Adaptation by opportune conditionality: Bilateral agreements between the European 
Union and third countries lead to a cooperation in certain areas. 
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4. Adaptation by inopportune conditionality: There is a policy transfer to a third country 
imposed in a more authoritative manner. Not complying usually leads to a significant cost 
for the third country. 
In order to understand the mechanisms through which the EU influence non-member states, 
Lavenex and Uçarer (2004) point out a number of variables that will define what kind of 
adaptation third countries follow when they are affected by EU policies. The variables can be 
seen in the following model of dynamics and forms of external effects: 
 
Fig. 1, Lavenex and Uçarer 2004: 426 
The first variable to take into account is the existing institutional linkages between the European 
Union and third countries. This linkage indicates the context and limitation of the policy transfer 
process that would take place. The authors enumerate five types of associations: 
● Close association: Comprehensive forms of association like the agreements with Norway 
and Switzerland. 
● Accession association: Previous negotiations and agreements before one country 
becomes a member state. 
● Pre-accession association: agreements with countries that expect to become a member 
state, but not in a near future. 
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● Neighbourhood association: agreements with neighbour countries that do not expect to 
become a member. 
● Loose association: agreements with countries geographically far from Europe. 
The second variable that should be taken into account is the “goodness of fit” between EU and 
third countries domestic policies. Lavenex and Uçarer (2004) understand that there had to be a 
certain degree of misfit if a process of adaptation has taken place. However, the bigger the 
degree of misfit of a third country is, the lower the incentives to align with EU policy are. 
The next variable to be aware of is the domestic opportunity structure. If the domestic debate and 
the institutional contexts tend to favour adaptation, there is a positive opportunity structure. 
However, if they tend to oppose policy transfer there is a negative opportunity structure (ibid: 
424). 
Finally, the last variable to be considered is the cost of non-adaptation. Third countries usually 
assess the consequences of non-alignment with EU policies. If the costs are too high, these non-
members will adapt even when the opportunity structure is negative (ibid). 
Once all the variables are taken into account and link to the mechanisms of adaptation previously 
described, Lavenex and Uçarer propose the “tapestry of relations” shown in the previous figure 
that condition the context and content of policy adaptation, and describe the dynamics and forms 
of the external effects of the EU policy influence (ibid: 426) 
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CHAPTER 4 Analysis 
 
As explained in the method chapter we have derived the mechanisms (type of association, policy 
compatibility, domestic opportunity structure and cost of non-adaptation) that make up external 
Europeanisation from the theory.  
In order to analyse whether the Moroccan policy on human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants is 
subject to Europeanization, we have two expectations we need to test to answer our research 
question. The two are: 1. There is Europeanisation of Moroccan policy; and 2. Europeanisation 
of Moroccan policy affects human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants. Once we know if 
Europeanisation takes place in Morocco, and what kind it is, we can then proceed to analyse the 
effect it has. 
This chapter is divided into two parts, with the first part analysing the mechanisms and whether 
our two expectations are correct, so we can answer our research question. In the second part we 
discuss the implications of the results of the analysis. 
When looking into the mechanisms we have decided to separate each one into two sections. In 
the first one, we look at the general functioning of the mechanism. In the second one, we narrow 
down our scope to look at the mechanisms within the area of immigration and human rights 
because we expect that both issues are interconnected. In the third mechanism, the first section 
that covers the overall functioning of the domestic structures is at the same time divided in three 
subsections: Political system, Moroccan economy and Social situation. 
4.1 Mechanisms 
We have divided this part of the analysis into four parts, one for each of the mechanisms, as it is 
important when doing process-tracing to make sure every part of a causal mechanism is present 
and function in the expected manner, to conclude that it has the predicted effect of being the 
causal link between X and Y. 
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4.1.1 Type of Association 
In this mechanism we look at links between Morocco and the European Union, paying special 
attention to the requirements the EU place in the agreements in order to follow the theory of 
Lavenex and Uçarer (2004). The institutional linkages are crucial to determine, as they point to 
the implications of cooperation and the possibilities for issue-linkages in the work towards 
desired results (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004: 423). 
The type of association between the EU and Morocco consist of many different forms and thus 
has very different effects. Agreements made between the EU and Morocco are formal and have 
specific requirements, that the parties must adhere to in some policy areas. It is therefore 
important that we understand the extent to which the EU is associated with Morocco, if we want 
to understand the effect this association has. 
The EU and Morocco implemented their first Association Agreement in 2000. The agreement 
specified that dealings between the parties should be conducted through the Association Council 
and by senior officials from Morocco on one side and the Council Presidency and the 
Commission on the other side (European Council 2000:3). The main focus of the agreement was 
to establish a free trade area between the EU and Morocco and most of the articles are therefore 
related to economics and the removal of trade barriers.  
Aside from the very specific issues of economic convergence, the agreement also promoted 
dialogue concerning a variety of different issues from security and emigration to human rights 
(ibid). The issues of an economic nature have requirements established for both parties, whereas 
the social area have no specified requirements, and only intentions of cooperation and open 
dialogue about these issues are stated. An example of this can observed in the Article 31 which 
explains:  
“The Parties agree to widen the scope of this Agreement to cover the right of establishment of 
one Party's firms on the territory of the other and liberalisation of the provision of services by 
one Party's firms to consumers of services in the other” (ibid: 9).  
This statement is very precise in what the parties have to do. However, when looking at social 
issues in the Agreement, the whole section (Title IV) is called “Dialogue in social and cultural 
matters” (ibid: 16), which is much more vague and does not involve any requirements. 
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An important thing to note about the agreement is that it specifically mentions that it does not 
limit the parties ability to act on issues: “which it considers essential to its own security in the 
event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order” (ibid: 18). 
This could mean that the parties are free to treat illegal immigrants how they want as long as they 
follow their own legislation and as long as they are considered a security threat. 
There is also a clear difference in commitment between the two parties exemplified by the 
statement: “Cooperation shall be aimed at helping Morocco bring its legislation closer to that of 
the Community in the areas covered by this Agreement” (ibid: 13). 
Since this initial Association Agreement between the EU and Morocco, the bond between the 
two parties has strengthened; more agreements have been made and Morocco has achieved 
“Advanced Status” (European Commission, 2014b: 3). These agreements consist, again, of 
requirements that the parties have to comply with, mostly trade related, in order to establish a 
free trade area and incorporate Morocco into the internal market, as well as more general 
ambitions of cooperation in social areas and human rights. 
During the continued relations the requirements have become many and much more varied, they 
are no longer purely trade related, but are now also concerned with infrastructure, environment 
and security, but the trend of separating requirements and cooperation depending to the nature of 
the issue is the same. The requirements put on Morocco either involve the implementation of EU 
legislation or a strong convergence. In addition, Morocco has also been invited to implement UN 
conventions, mostly concerning human rights and related issues (European Commission, 2009: 
4). The association between the EU and Morocco has remained bilateral since the signing of the 
Association Agreement, but the EU has encouraged Morocco to sign and implement UN 
conventions and Council of Europe conventions (European Council 2013: 23). 
The scope of the agreements has changed from focusing on state legislation to now also focusing 
on policies implemented at local levels. These policies are mainly related to environment, 
sanitation, education and other social policies, that are deemed important in order to improve the 
living conditions of the Moroccan population (European Commission 2007a). It is noteworthy 
that after the completion of the free trade area proposed in the Association Agreement, which 
was to be in full swing by 2012, the cooperation between the EU and Morocco has not slowed 
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down, on the contrary they are still making bilateral agreements, with both a Mobility 
Partnership and an Action Plan signed in 2013 alone. 
4.1.1.1 Human rights and immigration 
Initially, when the EU and Morocco signed the Association Agreement the focus was on 
economic integration and cooperation in the fight against illegal immigration, with human rights 
merely being a talking point. In the later action plans that followed there has been a change of 
focus. Trade is no longer far more important than everything else, but it is still the area where the 
EU has the biggest influence because it is where the requirements are placed.  
It is clear the EU is trying to make Morocco implement international human rights standards, but 
they have not asked for requirements to make binding agreements according to the documents 
analysed. It is also primarily the human rights of the Moroccan people that is the target of these 
activities, with the rights of women being the key objective of the EU (Bartolomeo 2009). 
On the other hand, cooperation regarding illegal immigration and cross-border crime seems to 
have strengthened since the 2006 action plan where the EU provided EUR 40 million to help 
with the training of judges, police, and border officials (European Commission, 2006a: 22). It 
seems the issue of illegal immigration is linked to the issue of cross-border crime and security as 
was exemplified by the focus of the dialogue promoted in the 2013-2017 action plan:  
“effectively combating illegal migration and human trafficking, including cooperation in 
relation to readmission and better border controls” (ibid), though they should keep “promoting 
and respecting the rights of migrants, whether they are Moroccan nationals residing in the EU 
or third country nationals in Morocco” (ibid).  
Even though human rights are mentioned there is a distinction in the importance placed on the 
two issues, with security being the primary concern of the two. 
It is also relevant to point out that it has not been possible for the EU to negotiate a readmission 
agreement with Morocco, though it is not due to lack of trying as references to these EU attempts 
can be found in most of the documents analysed (EEAS 2008; European Commission 2010; 
Mobility Partnership). However, as Lavenex and Uçarer points to 
“the failure to agree on the conclusion of readmission agreements exemplifies the limits of a 
one-sided approach dictated by the interests of the Union.” (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004: 433). 
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The failure of signing a readmission agreement could thus be a sign of the EU attempts to be still 
too one-sided, and not just a lack of commitment from Morocco.   
4.1.2 Policy compatibility 
In this section we look at the degree of fit of the Moroccan policy to the European Union and see 
whether this mechanisms works as expected regarding to the proposed EU policies. According to 
our theory of external Europeanisation, there must a certain degree of policy ‘misfit’ as a 
necessary condition for observing policy adaptation (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004: 424). Thus, no 
misfit makes it impossible to study the phenomenon of external Europeanisation in Morocco.   
Therefore, when analysing the documents regarding the agreements between the European Union 
and Morocco, it can quickly be inferred that there is a discrepancy between EU and Moroccan 
policies in the areas covered by these agreements, because there would not be any reason to look 
for convergence in policies if they were already aligned (European Council 2000: 13). 
However, it is also significant that in most of the documents signed by both actors the agreed 
changes are related to the changes that the Moroccan policy has to go through in order to make it 
more aligned with the EU’s. This is especially relevant because of the big spectrum of policies 
that are covered in Article 52 of the Association Agreement called “Approximation of 
legislation”. This article states: “Cooperation shall be aimed at helping Morocco bring its 
legislation closer to that of the Community in the areas covered by this Agreement” (ibid). 
This is the first cooperation agreement signed by the two parties and what stands out here is the 
fact that Morocco has accepted the convergence of all its legislation to the European Union’s in 
the many areas that the agreement covers.  
Mentions of this adaption of EU legislation into Moroccan legislation continue over time and it 
is still possible to find them in the most recent agreements between the two parties. This can be 
seen, for example, in the draft of the Action Plan for the implementation of the Advanced Status 
in 2013-2017: “Its aim is to move as close as possible to the EU in order to underpin and 
support its drive towards political modernisation, an open economy and social cohesion” 
(European Council, 2013: 9). Moreover, it was also established that “The subcommittees will 
accurately monitor regulatory alignment on the EU acquis under this Action Plan over the 
previous year and the national programme of regulatory convergence. (EEAS 2008: 76) 
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It is also significant that the adaptations of the Moroccan policy to that of the EU cover many 
policy areas and are very specific: 
● Environment: “Both parts confirm their commitment to the reinforcement of cooperation 
in this domain. The cooperation between Morocco and the EU will be reinforced 
according the next strategic orientations: Progressive convergence of the Moroccan 
legislation to the environmental legislation of the EU [...]” (ibid: 10). 
● Transport: “Define and apply operating standards comparable to those found in the 
Community. Bring equipment up to Community standards, particularly where multimodal 
transport, containerisation and transhipment are concerned” (European Council 
2000:13). 
The legislative adaptation in Morocco goes further because the European Union in several 
documents states that it does not only want specific measures. Instead, all of the Moroccan 
legislation should be inspired and converge towards the acquis communautaire of the EU. This 
can be seen in the 2008 Advanced Statues agreement: 
“Both parts confirm that this objective depends on the implementation of joint actions in four 
complementary approaches: (a) Accommodation of the Moroccan legislative framework to the 
acquis communautaire, (b) Conclusion of an Agreement of Global and Extensive Exchange (c) 
Social and Economic Cooperation and (d) the adhesion of Morocco to the transeuropean 
sectoral cooperation networks” (EEAS, 2008:4). 
The documents further show that the adaptation of the Moroccan policy comes with rewards. As 
it can be seen in the 2008 Advanced Status agreement, the legislative adaptation of Morocco can 
lead to funds the country wish to receive: 
“Programmes and agencies of the European Union: [...] The participation of Morocco in these 
programmes and agencies depends on the operational and budgetary modalities that will be 
agreed according to this effect and, more fundamentally, the implementation by Morocco of 
subjacent legislation and policies compatible with the objectives of this programmes and 
agencies. [...] Morocco wishes to benefit from the financial support due to its participation in 
these programmes and agencies” (ibid: 13). 
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Regarding the compromises required by the European Union to get a larger policy adaptation, 
the treatment of Moroccan workers stands out. This can be seen in the 2000 Association 
Agreement: 
“The treatment accorded by each Member State to workers of Moroccan nationality employed in 
its territory shall be free from any discrimination based on nationality, as regards working 
conditions, remuneration and dismissal, relative to its own nationals” (Association Agreement, 
2000: 16). 
However, immediately after this it can be read: “Morocco shall accord the same treatment to 
workers who are nationals of a Member State and employed in its territory” (ibid). It can be 
perceived that when the European Union agrees to adapt its legislation, it also asks for 
reciprocity, meaning that Morocco has to do the same. This contrast to the compromises made by 
Morocco and explained above, whereas the EU does not have the obligation to adapt according 
to Moroccan policy. 
Therefore, when analysing this mechanism we can conclude that there is a misfit of policies and 
the European Union wants a fit. From this analysis it can be deducted that there exists a pressure 
on Morocco as the EU asks for a policy adaptation in many policy areas. The EU is quite specific 
when it points out what changes it requires in the Moroccan policy, but it also wants all the 
Moroccan policy aligned and inspired by the acquis communautaire and gives rewards to 
Morocco in order to achieve that goal. The EU also makes compromises in policy change, but 
when the EU agrees to change something, it also asks for the same change in Morocco. This is 
not the case when Morocco changes its policies, which indicates a clear power relation within the 
agreements in favour of the EU.  
4.1.2.1 Human Rights and Immigration 
Regarding Human Rights and immigration, a big change of policy took place in Morocco in 
2003, three years after signing the Association Agreement with the EU. For the first time, 
Morocco defined an immigration policy. The country approved the Law 02-03 regarding the 
entrance and residence of foreigners in the Kingdom of Morocco, the emigration, and the 
irregular immigration (hereinafter Law 02-03). 
This law substituted old dahirs (Moroccan king’s decrees) from the 1930s and 1940s that were 
the only regulation Morocco had before passing the Law 02-03 (Elmadmad, 2004). These dahirs 
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did regulate migration in the French area of Morocco when it was a colony, therefore it could be 
argued that there was no actual migration legislation before. 
Since the 1960s, the Moroccan government had been encouraging emigration (de Haas, 2005), 
and until 2003, clandestine entry to the country was not a criminal offense. Article 12 of the 
Ordinance relating Immigration of 15 November 1934 specified that anyone who entered 
Morocco by “illicit means” would be expelled, but the law did not define such entry as a crime 
(Lindstrom 2002). 
In 1992, however, former King Hassan II publicly declared Morocco’s support to Spain to help 
combat illegal migration, corruption, and drugs. And it was under the ruling of the current King 
Mohammed VI that the new law was passed. This law has been characterized as a ‘new 
approach’ to immigration as the King gave explicit orders so that Morocco would tighten the 
control of its borders, combat transit migration, and treat migration as a security issue (Sadiqi, 
2004). 
Once all of this has been mentioned, one could reflect upon the fact that there could be 
something specific that has led Morocco to change its immigration policy after so many years 
without any specific actions, apart from intentions declared by the Moroccan kings, in relation to 
this topic. 
However, this cannot be seen in the text of the law further than the fact that it follows 
immigration practices that can be found in other countries. For example, regarding visas and 
documentation, the law determined the rules for documented entrance and all non-citizens have 
to provide evidence for “means of survival, the reasons for visiting Morocco, and the guarantees 
for the return” (ibid: 12). 
Article 4 in the Law 02-03 grants the right of Moroccan authorities to: 
“refuse the entrance to the territory to any person who does not meet the obligations or 
justifications defined by the dispositions here [in the text of the law 02-03] or by the laws and 
regulations regarding immigration” (Law 02-03 2003: 1). 
Undocumented entry into Morocco can result in a fine of 3000 DH and imprisonment for six 
months, and the punishment can be hardened for repeated offenders (Sadiqi 2004, 10). 
Foreigners who are discovered living in Morocco with undocumented status, including visa 
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overstay, can be punished by imprisonment, fines and deportation. In addition to criminalizing 
clandestine entry, it prescribes “severe punishment” from ten years to life imprisonment for the 
“organizers of illegal migration” (Sadiqi 2004 10). 
All these measures, fines and punishments gathered in the law could be interpreted as a change 
in how Morocco perceives immigration (GADEM for Justice Without Borders 2013). This new 
perspective is security-centred in the sense that tightening of border control and entrance 
regulations is seen as a way to increase security within the country. GADEM for Justice Without 
Borders (2010) interprets this as the result of EU’s pressure. One could discuss that Morocco has 
changed its immigration approach and now shares the same securitisation perspective as the EU. 
As explained earlier the EU has taken a very security centric approach on how to handle 
immigration, and it seems this approach is transferred to Morocco. Minor amendments 
rhetorically concerned with human rights were introduced in 2013 in the North African country 
(Debbarh 2013), but the mistreatment to sub-Saharan immigrants did not change (Human Rights 
Watch 2014). Again, Morocco got closer to the rhetoric of the EU, and at the same time kept its 
security approach with the immigrants still being abused. 
Regarding implementation, Law 02-03 specifies the official Moroccan immigration policy, but 
what happens on the ground is quite different. Law 02-03 guarantees migrants the right to an 
appeal, a translator, access to a lawyer, and contact with one’s consulate (Amnesty International 
2006), yet the more common state response is to imprison migrants or unofficially deport them to 
the desert of Algeria (Baldwin-Edwards 2006). 
However, it is not possible to find any mention to these situations in the EU’s assessments of 
Morocco in the framework of the ENP until 2011, when the EU in its Country Progress Report 
states: 
“A certain number of Moroccan human rights organisations’ reports denounced the conditions 
of interrogation and expulsion of migrants in irregular situation” (European Commission 2012: 
6). 
And here, the EU only mention the problem but it does not set any recommendations similar to 
the ones that it does in other policy areas as the ones mentioned at the beginning of this section. 
It is also relevant to remember that reports of these situations mentioned by the EU, was 
produced by Amnesty International already in 2006, five years before the EU puts it in the 
IPAP  RUC 
36 of 71 
Progress Report. Again it would indicate that the European Union does not link immigration 
with human rights, but rather with security. 
But the problems with the implementation of the law are deeper rooted. As the analysis of the 
Law 02-03 made by GADEM for Justice Without Borders explains: 
“In addition, Law 02-03 is either little or poorly known by judges and the authorities in charge 
of its application, which opens a path for the violation of the rights of foreigners” (GADEM for 
Justice Without Borders 2010: 33). 
In order to solve these problems, the EU has financed training programs for the legal civil 
servants in Morocco with diverse results: 
“Despite training and sensitisation of the legal profession, financed within the framework of 
international projects, including projects of the Union European, the approach of the Moroccan 
investigators and prosecutors to trafficking is not differentiated from that of the fight against the 
smuggling of migrants” (European Commission 2013b: 15). 
One could discuss that the training programs could also be considered a big influence, as it is the 
European Union that shapes the formation of Moroccan civil servants and their understanding of 
how they should implement the law. However the results do not look quite successful, so the 
extent to which this influence is relevant is questionable. 
In addition, according to a report financed by the EU and written by Khadija Elmadmad, the law 
is inspired by some French legislation and follow international trends regarding immigration 
regulatory policy, but there was no proof in the documentation analysed that this law was 
influenced by the European Union per se (Elmadmad 2004: 6). 
However, one relevant topic that could be discussed regarding this issue is the fact that Morocco 
only implemented a regulation like this one three years after signing a major agreement with the 
European Union: the Association Agreement from 2000. The Moroccan government ratified all 
major international agreements concerning refugees and human rights after gaining 
independence, such as the Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol (Lindstrom 2002, Amnesty 
International 2006). However, these were never transcribed into an actual regulation before 
2003. 
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Having all this in mind, one can see a big change in immigration policy in Morocco in 2003. 
This is relevant because the legislation until that point had been the same for more than 60 years 
and it introduced big changes including considering irregular migration as a crime. It also 
included measures that are similar to the ones applied in EU member states like visa permits, 
residency regulations and regular migrants’ rights. 
This shows a change in the approach to immigration because Morocco starts to consider it a 
matter of security as the European Union does. The EU even offers to train Moroccan legal civil 
servants, which one could consider a way of transferring the approach of the EU (European 
Commission 2006a: 22). 
Therefore, we could conclude that there is an influence from the EU on policy in Morocco. 
However, when analysing the documents that cover all these similarities between EU and 
Moroccan immigration policy it cannot be stated that actual requirements are made by the EU in 
order to converge. 
Moreover, when looking at the violations of immigrants’ human rights reported by NGOs, no 
mentions are made by the European Union until 2011, even though these reports had been 
published years before (Doctors Without Borders, 2005; Amnesty International, 2006). Even 
when a report of the violations is made, the EU does not ask for specific actions as it does in 
other policy areas. 
Therefore, it is difficult to consider that through this mechanism the European Union is 
pressuring Morocco to converge regarding immigrants’ human rights, but the lack of EU focus 
on this topic stands out and we will further discuss this in chapter 4.3. 
4.1.3 Domestic opportunity structure 
For this mechanism, we look at the national structures of Morocco to assess if there are domestic 
opportunity structures that favour or disfavour Europeanisation. This is done in order to see if the 
mechanism is present and if it works as theorised. 
When talking about domestic opportunity structure, Lavenex and Uçarer (2004) refer to the 
combination of strategic interest constellations and institutional conditions for change (Lavenex 
and Uçarer 2004: 424). Thus, we talk about positive or negative opportunity structures if the 
domestic institutional context is in favour or opposed to policy change.  
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The official name of the country is the Kingdom of Morocco and is considered the Arab World's 
oldest monarchy  (BBC). The capital of the county is the city of Rabat. Its borders are delimited 
in the West by the Atlantic Sea, in the North by Spain and the Mediterranean Sea, in the East by 
Algeria and in the South by the West Sahara. 
33 million people live in the country (World Bank, A) and its GDP is USD 103.8 billions - € 
94.3 billions - (World Bank, B) 
Morocco gained independence in 1959, after more than 40 years under France ruling as a 
protectorate. However, one third of the country was also a Spanish protectorate. In addition, the 
Moroccan city of Tangier was designated as international zone controlled by 8 different Western 
countries between 1923 and 1956 (Morocco World News). 
Once Morocco regained its current status, the sultan Mohammed V became the King of Morocco 
and continued the Alaoui family line of monarchs in the country that comes from the 17th 
century. In 1961, his son Hassan II became king and ruled with a very authoritarian style. Abuses 
of human rights, illegal incarcerations and disappearance of regime critics were common features 
during his time on the throne (Denoeux 2011).  
However, when his son Mohammed VI became king in 1999 he started a liberalisation of the 
country and started an expansion of the political process (Denoeux 2011). He also created a 
committee to reach the reconciliation with the victims of his father’s regime and allowed the 
exiled dissidents to return to the country.  
He still holds much power and a complete democratisation of the country has not taken place. 
However, it is interesting when looking at these mechanisms to realise that after completing his 
education, Mohammed VI was sent by his father to Brussels in 1988 in order to work and learn 
with Jacques Delors, then president of the Commission of the European Economic Communities 
(Morocco).  
This educational link to Europe continued in France where he wrote his PhD thesis called 
“Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the Arab Maghreb Union”. He is 
also the author of a book and several articles about Euro-Maghreb cooperation, as it is explained 
in the official website of the country, which contains a biography of the king (ibid). 
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Therefore, his interests in the cooperation with Europe and his educational links with France, 
plus his time working with the Commission could be observed as a big positive domestic 
opportunity structure, as we can infer that the King of Morocco has close ties with the European 
Union. 
However, this is not the only aspect in the life of the Moroccan monarch that could favour the 
EU interests in the country.  In addition to its lands and estates, the main source of wealth for the 
Moroccan family is the conglomerate Société Nationale d’Investissement. This conglomerate 
gathers 34 companies present in a dozen economic sectors in the country -banking, energy, 
mining, telecom, real estate, tourism, distribution, etc.-, is the biggest private corporation in 
Morocco and in the summer of 2006 alone the King received around EUR 8.6 million in 
dividends (Benchemsi et. al 2015). 
We consider this a big positive domestic opportunity structure because not only the country, but 
the King himself benefits financially from entering in the internal market and much of the 
Moroccan economic sector is developed in this way. 
Political system 
Morocco is a constitutional monarchy where the King still holds much power (Index Mundi). 
Under the new Constitution, which was ratified by referendum in 2011, the king still has the 
power to dissolve the parliament, dismiss the prime minister and appoint a new one (BBC). 
This Constitution was designed in the context of the Arab Spring, when a part of the Moroccan 
society demonstrated in the streets to demand changes in the country. Modernisation and 
improvement of the social situation were the main requests, together with the end of corruption 
and more democratisation (Alejandro, 2011).  
However, contrary to what happen in other countries like Egypt or Tunisia, the 20 February 
Movement, which emerged from the protests, accepted the Moroccan king as a legitimate 
interlocutor to negotiate with (El País). 
Within that situation, the King accepted to open and favours a social dialogue (European 
Commission, 2012: 3). This situation led to great changes as the European Union reflected in its 
reports: 
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“The year 2011 is being characterised by a great political evolution: After the revendications 
expressed by the population, the King in his speech of 9th of May announced a deep 
constitutional reform [...] this new constitution opens the way to big democratic reforms” (ibid:  
2).  
Months before passing the new Constitution, general elections were celebrated and for the first 
time since Morocco gained independence an Islamist party took power. Abdullah Benkirane 
became Prime Minister and as expected because of the trajectory of the party, which had aligned 
with the moderation imposed by the King, he has not introduced big changes in Morocco 
regarding the islamisation of the Moroccan legislation (Spiegel, 2011). 
An example of this moderation shown by the Benkirane’s government is the new reform of the 
abortion in the country in 2015, where the right to ask for an abortion has been extended to 
women that suffered rape and when the fetus has malformations. Before, only women whose life 
was in danger because of the pregnancy were entitled to (Peregil 2012). 
This can be interpreted as the will of the King, contrary to a islamisation of the country, and the 
opposition of part of the Moroccan society, who even ask for more modernisation and reforms as 
explained above, avoiding deep changes that could go against the EU values. Therefore, it is 
possible to deduce that when even factors like religion or tradition enter in the national political 
arena of Morocco, there is room for reforms, which will get closer to the EU’s regulations and 
values. 
In addition, the credibility of the whole parliamentary system has decreased because of the 
perception of inefficiency due to the monarchy dominance in policy making (Denoeux, 2011: 2). 
Moreover, the prime minister has less power in shaping policy than the royal advisors and no 
independent authority (ibid: 3). This shows that as a long as the King is willing to collaborate 
with the EU, no changes in government will affect this relation. 
In the international area, Morocco has been considered for a long time as a strong ally of 
Western countries. Especially close are Morocco’s relations with France, Spain and the US. 
During the last visit to the US, President Barack Obama gave his support for the new plan 
regarding West Sahara. Morocco is also important to the US, because of its close relations to 
Israel and Palestine, which could be used to reduce the tension in the area (Saiz, 2013)  
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The Moroccan government has also highlighted the good relations with the United States, as the 
Moroccan Ministry of Industry did in an article in Forbes magazine, where she celebrated the 
good and deep political and economic relations that both countries have (Dolan, 2013). 
Like the US, Spain also consider Morocco a close ally and especially in the fight against 
terrorism. The Spanish government has doubled the spending on border control and security 
since 2013 (Galvéz 2015) and the Ministries of Domestic Affairs from both countries meet every 
six months to continue working in their strategy to combat jihadist terrorism and illegal 
immigration (Pagola 2014). 
This close relation grew while at the same time the relation between Morocco and France 
deteriorated in 2013. The conflict between the two countries, with a long history of close 
relations, started when the French police went to the Moroccan embassy in Paris to interrogate 
the head of the Moroccan intelligence after a lawsuit was filed against him by Moroccan activist 
denouncing him as an alleged accomplice of torture (Irish, J. et al, 2014)  
The dispute escalated when news broke about the French ambassador in the US saying that 
France was looking to other side regarding violation of human rights in West Sahara leading the 
government to remove the US ambassador in Paris (Ajbaili 2014) 
The French President tried to solve the situation with personal phone calls to the King of 
Morocco (Irish, J. et. al 2014) due to the importance of the collaboration between both countries, 
especially regarding security and terrorism; however relations were not resumed until one year 
later, one month after the terrorist attacks in France in January, 2015 (Radio France International, 
2015).  
This strong collaboration between Morocco and Western countries shows how important 
Morocco is considered in the international arena, but also the willingness of the King and the 
Moroccan government to collaborate in diverse areas with Western countries. The openness of 
the Moroccan institutions to work together with these countries could be then considered as a 
positive domestic opportunity structure. 
Another relevant domestic factor for enhancing this collaboration could be the terrorist attacks 
that took place in Casablanca in 2003, which led to the design of new terrorist laws and increased 
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the fight against extremist groups and terrorism (BBC). In this attack, 31 people died and 64 
were wounded (Clarín 2003).  
Moroccan economy 
The country’s economy is based on natural resources and agriculture, together with tourism and 
the fishing industry (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2006:754). However, the Moroccan economy is 
very inefficient and reforms are needed so it can fulfil its potential: “The Moroccan economy is 
often described as an economy with high potential and low performance” (Cherkaoui and Ben 
Ali 2006: 741). Issues such as an inefficient public administration and an excessive centralization 
limit the possibilities of the private sector. Furthermore, the industrial sector lacks competition, 
as the politics were not able to address the structural problems, e.g. lack of education (ibid: 754). 
The relations that EU maintains with its neighbours regarding its economic development have 
heavily influenced Morocco. One of the main European countries that Morocco had mutual 
exchanges with has been Spain. Thanks to the close ties with Spain, the “development of 
partnership in the sectors of car industry, renewable energy, shipbuilding and industrial 
technical centers” has been possible (Morocco 2014b).  
The importance of this relation for Spain with Morocco has been highlighted by the current 
Minister of Industry, José Manuel Soria, who “confirmed the interest by Spanish entrepreneurs 
in developing projects in Morocco, projects with common value added that benefit from the 
industrial sector's know-how and expertise.” (Ibid.). 
The domestic interest to maintain this close ties with a EU member state as Spain could be 
interpreted as a positive opportunity structure. Moreover, the Morocco-Spain ties fit well within 
the framework of a new development plan, which aims at improving the economic and industrial 
conditions of Morocco in the period from 2014 to 2020 (ibid). In addition, last December Nizar 
Baraka, the president of the CESE (Economic, Social and Environmental Council) declared that 
“The Moroccan economy is undergoing a real metamorphosis in a context marked by a drastic 
change in foreign trade with the emergence of new international jobs mainly in the car industry” 
(Morocco 2014c). We see here a domestic interest to open to the international market. 
The economic growth of Morocco is, however, an ongoing process that started long before the 
above-mentioned changes. In fact, most of the economic indicators - e.g. GDP, export, import, 
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and public expenditure - of the Moroccan economy arose from 1980 to 2011 (El Mehdi Falloul 
& Saadallah 2014). The reason behind this steady economic upturn can be found in the “increase 
in the primary sector and the good appearance of the non-agricultural sector” (El Mehdi Falloul 
& Saadallah 2014: 340). However, the agricultural sector still represents a very important sector 
in the Moroccan economy, which contributed to nearly 15% of GDP in 2013 (Mansour & Castel 
2014: 3).   
In the field of international trade, the amount of exports “has gone from a value of 80 billion in 
1980 to 250 billions DH [dirhams] in 2008” (El Mehdi Falloul & Saadallah 2014: 343). The 
reason behind this sound increase in exports is that: 
“Morocco chose to follow a trade policy based on regional integration and strong economic co-
operation, both with the Mediterranean region and sub-Saharan Africa. Morocco has signed 
numerous bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements so as to allow its economy to 
integrate into global trade; these have included agreements with the European Union, the United 
States, Turkey, and several Arab countries through the Agadir Agreement and the Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU)” (Mansour & Castel 2014: 6).  
Morocco’s biggest trading partners are the EU-28 and the US, with the former making up 53.6% 
of total trade and the latter 6.4%, in 2013 (European Commission, 2013a). 
Therefore, we once again see a domestic strategy based in international agreements and trade. 
This strategy could favour the interest of Morocco to work closer with the EU, especially when it 
is its main trade partner. 
The Moroccan economy was not hit as hard by the financial crisis and managed to recover with a 
“growth in 2013 with GDP rising 4.7% compared to 2.7% in 2012, despite the slowdown in 
world growth.” (Mansour & Castel 2014: 2). 
When analysing public expenditure, an increase can be perceived (El Mehdi Falloul & Saadallah 
2014: 342). These changes in public expenditure can be linked to institutional changes in recent 
years in Morocco, aimed at modernising the public sector. One of the main examples is 
represented by the Public Administration Reform support Programme (PARAP), which was 
almost completed with “the adoption of the new Constitution in 2011 and with the commitment 
to strengthen government and reform the administration.” (Mansour & Castel 2014: 9). 
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This shows a domestic interests to implement reforms, regardless the cost, therefore one could 
interpret Morocco would be positively open to accept changes that the European Union could 
propose. 
Social situation 
The poverty in Morocco has been reduced significantly in the last years. Between 2001 and 
2011, absolute poverty fell from 15.3% to 6.2%; with a decrease in the urban areas from a 7.6% 
to a 3.5% and in the rural areas from a 22% to 10% (Mansour and Castel 2014: 11). 
A big gap between rural and urban areas can be observed. This is specially relevant because the 
King made the reduction of poverty a priority (BBC), and one can deduce that one strategy used 
in order to do so is increasing the relations with the EU because is its main export partner. Rural 
areas whose economy is based on agriculture can benefit from increasing the exports of its 
products to the European Union. Therefore, an increase in agricultural exports to the EU could 
help alleviate the issue of rural poverty. 
Moreover, it seems that the European Union has interpreted that there is a domestic opportunity 
there and has offered to: “Strengthen the efforts of the government and local authorities to 
alleviate poverty, social exclusion, insecurity and to reduce social risk factors, so creating a 
dynamic propitious for human development and increasing the country’s human capital and 
social cohesion” (EEAS 2007: 5). 
Although there is big reduction of poverty, one structural problem that remains in Morocco is the 
unemployment. In 2007, “unemployment, informal employment and underemployment are a 
source of concern” (European Commission 2007b: 14). Something that in 2011 had not changed: 
“Regarding the social situation, the unemployment is still high, mainly among young people, 
graduates and women from big cities” (European Commission 2012: 3). 
The Moroccan institutions see this as a threat to stability and security (European Commission 
2007b: 14). Therefore, one could deduce that institutions and authorities would be willing to sign 
agreements that could improve this situation as the European Union promises.  
Moreover, this is not only seen in regard to unemployment but in all kinds of social distribution 
and equality. The Moroccan government is interested in improving “the lack of functioning 
redistribution mechanisms and adequate social nets” (European Commission 2007b: 9). 
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However, “reforms are ongoing or in the pipeline but are still inadequate to deal with the scale 
of the problem” (ibid). 
Again, we would deduce that the Moroccan government is interested in solving this, and 
therefore this Moroccan willing could be considered a positive domestic opportunity for the 
European Union. 
Another example of what we interpret as a positive domestic opportunity structure is the interest 
of the Moroccan government to reduce illiteracy. According to UNICEF, in 2013 total adult 
literacy was 67.1%: 88.8 % and 74% of literacy in men and women respectively in the age of 15-
24 (UNICEF). The same source shows that the rate of children enrolled in school is 96.2%. Here 
there is a trend of reduction that could be improved by the different programs and funding that 
the EU offers regarding education (17 million Euros in the 2007 action plan, 93 million Euros in 
2009 action plan, 10 million Euros in 2010 Action Plan). Therefore, we deduce that there could 
be a domestic interest to accept this EU plans. 
When looking into gender issues, the Moroccan government has focused in the last years in 
reducing the gender inequality gap and improve the living conditions of Moroccan women.  
(European Commission 2013b: 7). One possible explanation for this is the founding that the 
European Union provides to tackle this situation. In 2012, the EU invested 45 million Euros to 
support the implementation of a national plan for the promotion of equality among women (ibid: 
7p). 
Regarding civil right in Morocco, Denoeux (2011) explains that civil society is quite active in the 
country and more effective to pressure than political parties, but at the same time they have little 
room and many constraints to influence in policy making. In addition, NGOs maintain close 
financial ties with the government and are very financially dependant on it, with more benefits 
for those really close to the regime (Denoeux 2011). 
4.1.3.1 Immigration 
Regarding immigration, there is much cooperation with the European Union in border control. 
However the readmission agreement that the EU has been asking for many years has yet not been 
reached: 
“In terms of strengthening border management, cooperation with EU continued in the 
framework of a cooperation program that just ended. The exchange of information on legal 
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migration issues continues regularly. Better cooperation, especially between Morocco and Spain 
has reduced illegal migration in 2009. However, the negotiations of the EU-Morocco 
readmission agreement have seen no real progress.” (European Commission 2010: 14). 
A lack of agreement on this issue could be due to the many Moroccan immigrants in the 
European Union and the concern, on the part of Morocco, that illegal immigrants will be sent 
from Europe to Morocco, especially with the many sub-Saharan immigrants already in the 
country (GADEM for Justice Without Borders 2013).  
This high number of immigrants in the Moroccan territory could be interpreted as a positive 
domestic opportunity structure to implement a securitisation approach. The domestic situation of 
the increase of sub-Saharan immigrants could be a factor that makes Morocco want to accept this 
approach, because it enables the government to make it more difficult for the sub-Saharan 
immigrants to stay in the country. 
However, while we see domestic factors that could lead to alignment of the migration policy to 
the EU’s, we have not found any domestic interests to align with the values promoted by the EU 
regarding human rights for immigrants. We deduce from here that the domestic structures have 
not found any incentive to converge. 
It is interesting that in 2013 the EU and Morocco signed the Mobility Partnership, which 
regulated the entrance and residence of immigrants from both parties in the Europe and 
Morocco. It is an agreement that has beneficiated the more than 3 million Moroccans living in 
the European Union (MPC Team, 2013) because one of the main goals of this partnership is to 
improve the circulation of regular migration (Mobility Partnership, 2013: 4) and therefore 
remove the barriers they could face. 
We interpret that, given the big size of the Moroccan Diaspora, as a sign of the Moroccan 
government and the King being interested in facilitating the living conditions of so many 
Moroccan people and in doing so gaining their support. It would be a means to receive support 
from abroad and send a positive image of the regime through the support of its Diaspora. 
Therefore, we consider that there is a domestic interest in signing this agreement. 
We see here a difference between the attention paid to the Moroccan immigrants abroad and the 
treatment to the sub-Saharan immigrants in Morocco. Even when the Moroccan Diaspora is far 
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from home, the Moroccan government look for improving their living conditions. However, 
there are no domestic interests in improving the living conditions of the sub-Saharan immigrants 
in the country. One could deduce from this that the lack of incentives to change the latter leads to 
this gap between these two migrant populations. 
Having in regard all what has been explain in this section, we can conclude therefore that in the 
Moroccan political, economic and social areas there are positive domestic opportunity structures 
working according to the theory of Lavenex and Uçarer (2004). 
 4.1.4 Cost of non-adaptation 
The fourth mechanism of Europeanisation is the cost of non-adaptation of EU policy, which 
illustrates the assessment third-countries make of consequences of non-alignment with EU 
policies. Therefore, countries choose to adapt to EU policies if the costs of not doing so are too 
high and outweigh the negative domestic opportunity structures. 
In this chapter we will analyse the different costs of EU policy adaptations for Morocco to see 
how high or low the costs of non-adaptation are, and thus discuss possible benefits and 
disadvantages from aligning with EU policy, especially on areas of immigration and human 
rights. 
Financial support and agreements 
The EU- Morocco Association Agreement from 2000 is built to gradually establish a free trade 
area between the two parties (European Council 2000: 3), and eventually facilitate a full 
liberalisation of the movement of capital between Morocco and the EU community (Ibid: 9). 
Morocco will thus benefit from e.g. agricultural products import and export due to no custom 
duties and charges between the two (Ibid: 3).  
EU being the biggest importer of Moroccan products, Morocco is set to benefit from this 
agreement, bringing the country closer to the internal market and thus improving the Moroccan 
economy (European Commission 2009a: 10). Trade between the EU and Morocco is 
comprehensive: in 2008 with an increase of 3.4% in Moroccan export to the EU and 16.4% 
increase of Moroccan import from the EU (European Commission 2009a: 10). In 2013 the total 
trade between the two parties amounted to approximately €27 billion, with EU imports 
amounting to 60.6% of Morocco’s export. However, Morocco is not the biggest importer of the 
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EU, therefore the EU is more important to the Moroccan economy than Morocco is to the EU’s 
(European Commission 2013a). 
However, the impact of the economic crisis in Europe was felt in Morocco because of the 
bilateral trade between Morocco and the EU, with a decline in trade compared to previous years. 
The EU remains the first trade partner of Morocco, even if Moroccan exports to the EU suffered 
a decline of 22.6% while EU exports to Morocco declined by 17.6% (European Commission 
2010: 10). 
Morocco reached Advanced Status in 2008, which acknowledges the ambitious objective of 
integrating Morocco into the internal market of the EU. The working group who assigned the 
Advanced Status of Morocco put emphasis on the necessity of the progressive incorporation of 
the acquis communautaire of the EU in order to facilitate the integration of trade (EEAS 2008 4). 
As mentioned before in this analysis, the EU requires Moroccan policy to move towards the 
policies of the EU and an adaptation of the acquis communautaire to receive the support and 
integration into the internal market. Doing so, according to the EU, will stimulate the structural 
reform and thus develop the growth of the economy in Morocco and at the same time reduce the 
poverty and develop the employment and the social cohesion (European Council 2000: 4). The 
working group especially points to a modernisation of the agricultural sector, as approximately 
40 % of the Moroccan population is employed within agriculture and it is a sector that 
experiences great pressure. A modernisation of the agricultural sector will thus potentially 
alleviate a big part of the Moroccan population (Advanced Status 2008: 9). 
All this shows that both markets are deeply interconnected after all the agreements signed by the 
two actors and a change in the conditions in this area will lead to great consequences especially 
for Morocco, meaning that the costs of not continuing to meet EU requirements regarding market 
adaptation would be significantly high.  
But markets integration is not the only thing that Morocco gains from aligning with the EU. The 
EU/Morocco Action Plan from 2006 further supports the Association Agreements, in the sense 
that additional financial assistance to Morocco will be given to implement all the sections of the 
Association Agreement along with the operations of the Action Plan (European Commission 
2006a: 2). 
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With the Association Agreement, the EU also support Morocco in examining suitable ways of 
restoring financial equilibrium and build structural policies with the intention of boosting growth 
and eventually enhance social welfare in Morocco (European Council 2000: 17). Further, the 
EU-Morocco Association Agreement allows workers of Moroccan nationality, along with their 
families, to receive similar social security and treatment as EU citizens of the member states in 
which they are employed (ibid: 15). 
In the Progress Report from 2013, Morocco is still classified as one of the main beneficiaries of 
the EU financial cooperation regarding the ENP (European Commission 2014a: 3), but 
slowdowns in financial assistance have occurred due to delays in the Moroccan implementation 
of some policies (European Commission 2014a: 3). This further proves that financial aid has 
become one of the EU’s chosen instruments to attempt to affect, persuade, and pressure countries 
like Morocco in a direction according to the EU’s wishes (GADEM for Justice Without borders 
2010: 7). 
Therefore, Morocco not only manages to enter the common market but also receives extra 
financial support when aligning with the EU. Vice versa, if Morocco does not meet the EU 
requirements it will lose the financial support. 
In the data analysed, we can find the exact figures of funds that Morocco receives. The financial 
support the EU has directed towards Morocco entail the two MEDA’s, which are the EU’s 
principal financial instrument regarding the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (European 
Commission, 2007b: 17). The budgetary resources allocated under MEDA were €3.4 billion for 
1995-1999 and €5.4 billion for 2000-2006, Morocco being the principal beneficiary of the 
MEDA, receiving €812 million of the €5.4 billion for 2000-2006 (ibid).  
The NIP of Morocco allocate €654 million to cover the four years of the 2007-2010 NIP to 
manage the Country Strategy Paper (EEAS, 2007: 3), and finally according to the Commission 
Decision from 2009, the maximum contribution of the Community to the annual action 
programme of Morocco is set at €123 million plus a maximum of €20 million (European 
Commission 2009b). 
Hence, Morocco has received a lot of financial support from the EU. The costs of non-adaptation 
of EU policies will therefore be high, as it is in Morocco’s best interest to receive the financial 
support to develop the economic and social policies and state of the nation. When failing to 
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implement the EU policies, the financial support gets slowed down or even withdrawn. Morocco 
has a great interest in becoming integrated into the internal market, as big parts of Moroccan 
economy are based on imports from and exports to the EU, and thus the financial costs of not 
aligning with the Association Agreement, the Action Plan, and the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between the EU and Morocco, would be high. 
Therefore, when taking into account the interconnection of both markets, the Moroccan 
dependency in exports to the EU, the rewards and sanctions placed by the EU when Morocco fail 
align their legislation, and the specific allocations of EU money in Morocco described above, 
then the cost of non-adaptation for Morocco is considerably high and the EU is using this 
pressure to get Morocco closer to the EU acquis communautaire.  
Bilateral agreements like those made between the EU and Morocco are not covered by 
international law, so the parties are not bound by any authority to fulfil its commitment. 
However, the parties are bound by their respective promises, and if one part does not fulfil that, 
the other has no reason to either, so the cost of non-adaptation is part of what determines if the 
parties follow the agreement. Future relations between the parties is also a factor, that determines 
if the parties adhere to the agreements, since long-term relations will be severely damaged, if one 
party renege on what is agreed. 
4.1.4.1 immigration and human rights 
Projects and programmes in the social field are furthermore a priority in the agreements between 
the two parties, and especially the priority of reducing migratory pressure is interesting to this 
project. According to the Association Agreement, priority will be given to: “reducing migratory 
pressure in particular by improving living conditions, creating jobs and developing training in 
areas from which emigrants come” (European Council 2000: 16). These priorities were 
translated into financial support from the EU. 
The National Indicative Programme for 2005-2006 puts the strategy for implementing the 
Association Agreement into practice through five priorities, in which one of them is:  
“Migration management, including border control management (EUR 40 million), institutional 
support for the movement of persons (EUR 5 million) and the development of the northern 
provinces (EUR 42 million)” (European Commission, 2004: 3). 
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The NIP from 2002 thus outline a strategy in which the border control management receives 
almost the same financial support as the development of the northern provinces, which are 
heavily challenged by poverty (ibid). 
The EU will additional allocate funds for countries that adopt national action plans on human 
rights, allowing partners that are making progress on human rights to receive other additional 
funds not necessarily related to human rights, which they can use in other policy areas (European 
Commission, 2004: 8). MEDA funds were also channelled specifically to migration in Morocco, 
with the aim of improving the management of migratory flow along with the promotion of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms (European Commission, 2007b: 17). However, all these 
references to immigration usually are connected to migrants born in Morocco and human rights 
of Moroccan citizens. What the EU wants is to develop the country in order to avoid large-scale 
migration. No references are made to sub-Saharan migrants and the violations of their human 
rights.  
Nevertheless, there are some funds that are actually allocated to help Morocco to deal with 
immigration. The management of border controls was redirected in order to provide financial 
support for a new programme aimed at upgrading the migration strategy, with the budget of 
approximately €67 million (European Commission, 2006b: 10). Thus, according to the ENP 
from 2006, the funds had been allocated to work more holistic with an immigration strategy 
instead of a strategy mainly on border control between Morocco and the EU community, as 
stated in the 2002 NIP. 
It is however difficult to deduce if the EU has given financial support for a new immigration 
strategy because it wants to improve the situation of immigrants or only because the old strategy 
of controlling borders was not working. No specific mention of human rights of immigrants is 
made. Neither rewards are promised for policies with a more respectful human rights approach is 
followed nor sanctions are defined in case of violation of immigrants’ human rights. Therefore, 
we could deduce that the costs of non-adaptation to the EU standards of human rights respect are 
low. 
4.2 Type of policy transfer mode 
Following the theory of Lavenex and Uçarer (2004), the reason to analyse these mechanisms is 
to test if external Europeanization in Morocco and in the area of immigration and human rights is 
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taking place, and to capture the nuances of the external impact of EU migration policies 
(Lavenex and Uçarer 2004: 420). Depending on how these mechanisms work, our expectations 
can be validated or rejected. The results obtained in our analysis of the mechanisms are as 
follows: 
 Type of 
association 
Policy 
compatibility 
Domestic 
opportunity 
structure 
Cost of non-
adaptation 
Moroccan policy EU requirements Misfit Positive High 
Immigration and 
human rights 
No EU 
requirements 
Misfit Positive Low 
 
This table shows that the transfer mode of policy through the external effects of the EU regarding 
Moroccan policy is policy transfer through opportune conditionality. This means the EU 
gives Morocco a sort of reward if they comply with the conditions, and withhold the reward if 
they do not, which fits well with what is theorised about EU external relations (ibid: 424). Policy 
transfer through opportune conditionality is when policy is transferred from the EU to a third 
country, through a binding agreement that puts certain conditions on the country, but where the 
country see it as in their best interest to do it. This mode of policy transfer is especially in the 
interests of Morocco on issues that the EU is more capable of handling (ibid: 421), such as 
policies regarding the internal market.  
Regarding Human rights and immigration, the transfer mode of policy is according to our 
analysis policy adaptation through deliberate emulation. This means that Morocco is adopting 
policies on the initiative of the EU even though there are no formalized requirements to do so. In 
the case of human rights and immigration, there were previously no regulations along with the 
existing absence of an overarching international regime on immigration policy, why Morocco, 
based on national interests of securitization and access to the internal market, seeks alignment 
with the EU (ibid: 420). 
We have found through our analysis that the adaptation of immigration policy and issues of 
human rights needs to be separated and not treated as policies that goes hand in hand, despite 
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what our initial expectations was and thus our approach to the analysis. Even if our analysis 
points to the policy adaptation of immigration policies, the issues of human rights have not been 
adapted in the same manner. There is a clear distinction between the domestic interests in 
securing the Moroccan borders and thus an adaptation of EU securitisation and the Moroccan 
interests (or lack of it) in securing human rights of especially sub-Saharan immigrants.    
This division that we have discovered though the analysis of mechanisms will be part of the 
further discussion in the following chapter. 
4.3 Discussion 
As we have tested the theoretical concept of external Europeanisation and identified the transfer 
mode of Moroccan policy to be based on adaptation and transfer, questions arise about the 
implications that this external impact of the EU has on the human rights of sub-Saharan 
immigrants. Thus, in this chapter we will discuss our theoretical approach to Moroccan 
Europeanisation as well as the implications that might affect human rights of sub-Saharan 
immigrants in Morocco and the EU’s role in this relation.       
From the theory of external Europeanisation, we can see that Morocco should be placed in the 
neighbourhood association group. According to the theory, this means that the relations between 
the EU and Morocco should be “quite occasional, sectoral, and inspired by more short-term 
interests on both sides” (Lavenex & Uçarer 2004: 17). What we have found is that the 
agreements between the EU and Morocco were quite occasional in the beginning, with four years 
passing between the Association Agreement and the ENP in 2004. Furthermore, the initial 
agreement was fairly sectoral, as it mainly focused on trade and market regulations; as a 
consequence, it had a bigger impact in sectors that expected to be influenced by a free trade area, 
such as agriculture and fishery. However, temporary interests do not usually inspire a free-trade 
area policy. Therefore, it can be inferred that long-term policies have been on the agenda since 
the very beginning. 
Looking at later agreements, we can see that the pace of interaction between the parties 
intensified, especially since Morocco expressed its interest in achieving Advanced Status in 
2008. The agreements cover far more policy areas than just trade, agriculture and fishery as it 
was in the beginning. They now involve a lot of different issues, such as social and 
environmental policies. 
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There has been an increase in the focus on short-term policies as well; however, they stem from 
the necessity of achieving a long-term goal, which can be represented by the social, economic, or 
environmental improvement in the country. Even though the policies themselves have a short 
time schedule, the output they produce is long lasting, e.g. school construction. Relations are 
therefore no longer occasional or sectoral: they are still guided by long-term interests. 
Taking this into account, it seems that Morocco has a lot in common with the countries that 
belong to either pre-accession or accession association groups, as Morocco is still having a 
degree of misfit in many policy areas, but also implementing a lot of the acquis communautaire. 
This could be seen as unusual for a country in the neighbourhood association group. However, 
unlike the countries of pre-accession and accession association groups, the EU cannot use the 
condition of possible future EU membership as leverage to influence Morocco. From a cultural, 
historical, and ideological point of view, Morocco is still too distant from the comprehensive 
association countries, even though Morocco is converging more towards those countries, 
according to our argumentation in the analysis. 
The reason for this change can be found in the consequences related to incorporating Morocco 
into the internal market. In order to have a functioning internal market, it is important to have 
similar legislation in areas that make use of it; otherwise, the internal market is going to be 
inefficient, and thus limiting its whole purpose. If workers can move freely between Morocco 
and the EU, and if there is a big disparity in social conditions, then a lot of people might migrate 
to the EU. This is a situation both parties want to avoid: “Recognizing that poverty and socio-
economic imbalances are the root causes of any migratory movement” (Mobility Partnership 
2013: 4). This has been mentioned as an issue and could therefore be an explanation of the 
changes in the kind of associations. 
It is not clear if the change in the status of Morocco’s association is an indicator of a general 
tendency in EU external relations, but it is something that will be worth analysing in the future 
from other countries’ perspective. We would argue that the EU’s intention of offering third 
countries a stake in the internal market (European Commission, 2006a) would inevitably lead to 
a change in association to avoid unintended consequences for both the EU member states and the 
country with whom they are associated. 
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The Action Plan as part of the ENP is one of the EU’s key tools in promoting democratisation 
and stability in its neighbouring countries. However, as we have argued, the economic reforms 
are by far better developed in its implementation in Morocco than the EU norms of democracy 
and respect for human rights. As we have argued in the analysis, we see policy adaptation 
through deliberate emulation on immigration areas, thus Morocco adapting to EU policy for 
domestic benefits. The EU is hence able to promote reforms where the political leadership sees 
them working towards their own benefit (Voss, 2015). 
According to a study from May 2015 of the ENP in Morocco, the government is in the shadow 
of the Moroccan elite close to the King (ibid), why even alleged well-functioning elections in 
practice show no influence of the people. Though there are democratic elections, the elite is 
capable of overriding the public decision and render the popular decision meaningless. Thus, the 
strategy of the democratic reforms and norms of human rights of the ENP arguable is somewhat 
failed, as the elite does not necessarily perceive these policies to be beneficial for themselves. 
Generally, most of the elites in the EU’s neighbourhoods apparently do not wish to Europeanise, 
as is arguable the case of Morocco, where the “(…) autocratic elites reject comprehensive 
modernisation as they feel threatened by it” (Speck, 2015). 
This argument thus points to the risk of EU being supportive of the Moroccan elite to keep the 
undemocratic structures of the country, as none of the ENP reforms fundamentally challenges the 
power structures and thus genuinely push for democratic reform (Voss, 2015). 
We have argued that Moroccan adaptation of immigration policy is merely an adaptation of 
securitisation of its own borders, as this policy works in favour of the Moroccan elite’s own 
interests. In this regard, it is essential to point to the separation of immigration policy and respect 
for human rights, as there is evidence for the Moroccan government not being committed to 
democratic reform and values of human rights, as presented in the ENP (ibid). The lack of 
commitment to securing human rights is evident in the different approach to economic reforms 
promoted by the Action Plan, as economic problems are addressed systematically and specific 
benchmarks can be identified for assessment, unlike democratic and human rights reforms (ibid). 
The study of ENP in Morocco from 2015 further argues, that this lack of genuine commitment of 
the Moroccan government together with the lack of pressure from the EU is based on the EU 
interest in keeping the country stable, as the EU needs a stable, strong government as an ally in 
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the fight against illegal immigration (ibid). Thus, by prioritising stability, the EU engages in the 
support of undemocratic regimes in the pursuit for economic integration without fundamentally 
altering their nature and no genuine push for democratic reforms and norms of human rights  
(ibid). Hence, we argue that the adaptation of policy in Morocco is a case of securitization and 
further that the EU is indirectly supporting the lack of human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants 
in Morocco by not prioritizing it in its agreements. 
This argument is to some extent supported by the NGO Justice Without Borders, but as they see 
Morocco on its way to a better functioning democracy they accuse the policies of the EU in 
terms of securitisation to be the reason for the lack of a better democratic development along 
with no development of norms of human rights (GADEM for Justice Without Borders 2010: 7p). 
Hence, they join the argument of a EU lack of engagement in ensuring norms of human rights in 
Morocco in order to secure EU’s borders by focusing on economic reforms. Morocco is not so 
keen on implementing human rights reforms, so the EU chooses to focus on economic reform to 
secure its borders. 
Justice Without Borders argue, 
“In order to do this (securing its borders, ed.), the European Union attempts to find 
“arguments”, which are often economic, to convince these countries to fight alongside it. Transit 
countries, such as Morocco, are in this way invited to control their own border, turn back the 
immigrants that are present in their territory, and even to control European borders by stopping 
migrant from leaving” (GADEM for Justice Without Borders 2010: 7). 
Hence, Justice Without Borders argues that the EU makes the transit countries like Morocco do 
its “dirty job” of keeping the immigrants away from the EU borders. The same is argued by 
NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (Amnesty International 2014; 
Human Rights Watch 2014). 
The story of how Moroccan officials are treating immigrants at the borders of Spain, building 
higher and higher walls, has been brought in the media several times and all over the world 
(news.com.au 2014; Al Jazeera 2014; Alami 2013). The international focus on immigration to 
the EU has only recently intensified with the many deaths of immigrants trying to reach the EU 
on heavily overfilled boats crossing the Mediterranean Sea (Grierson, J. et al 2015). The 
discussions within the EU on these migration problems stretches from destroying the boats on 
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the coast of North Africa to strengthening the borders (Bjørn-Hansen 2015), hence further 
securitisation. Again, the EU puts limited pressure on the transit countries to make policies that 
develops norms of human rights, and from our analysis we argue that the problem of intensified 
immigration is not solved by more securitization of the EU borders. 
Human rights are a major issue in the EU as also the foundation of the ENP and the Action 
Plan’s core objectives are “Better governance, promotion of democracy and respect for human 
rights” (European Commission 2004: 5). The EU in general does take pride in its identity as a 
promoter of and an important global player on the field of human rights and democracy, as the 
very foundation of the EU, according to the EEAS lies: ”on a strong engagement to promote and 
protect human rights” (EEAS, A). Thus, the media attention on failed respect of human rights of 
sub-Saharan immigrants as well as pressure from a number of different interest groups is 
arguably a problem for the identity and legitimacy of the EU in regard of its external 
collaborations.   
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CHAPTER 5 Conclusion 
 
This project report seeks to investigate the relation between the European Union and Morocco in 
terms of human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants. We initially had the expectation that the 
concept of Europeanisation does not only influence policy, polity and politics of member states, 
but that the concept has an external dimension. We thus expected Morocco to be influenced by 
Europeanisation and that this influence is further possible to measure in how human rights of 
sub-Saharan immigrants is being respected or violated. This led to the following research 
question: 
Is the EU influence in Morocco a case of external Europeanisation, and what are the 
implications for human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants in Morocco? 
In order to test if the theoretical concept of external Europeanisation was present in Morocco, we 
operationalised the theory of external Europeanisation by Lavenex & Uçarer (2004) and 
combined it with the method of theory-testing process-tracing by Beach & Pedersen (2013). This 
allowed us to use evidence found in our data to argue if this was a case of external 
Europeanisation along with the type of transfer mode.  
We can conclude, that Moroccan policy is being influenced by the EU, and through our testing of 
evidence in terms of type of association, policy compatibility, domestic opportunity structure and 
cost of non-adaptation we have argued that there has been a policy transfer from the EU to 
Morocco through opportune conditionality, meaning that policy is transferred through 
agreements in the interests of Morocco. Regarding immigration policies, we conclude that there 
has been a policy adaptation through deliberate emulation, which indicates that Morocco has 
chosen to adapt to EU policy despite no requirements to do so. Thus we conclude that the 
relation between the EU and Morocco is a case of external Europeanisation according to the 
theory of Lavenex & Uçarer (2004).   
Though the theory of external Europeanisation has been a useful tool for understanding the 
association between the EU and Morocco, the relationship between the parties is complex and 
has evolved over time. Morocco does not fit perfectly in any of the categories made by Lavenex 
& Uçarer and it has arguably changed over time as Morocco has become more integrated with 
the EU. We have found that Morocco has gone from the neighbourhood association to something 
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more similar to the pre-accession association. This change of association is not something 
theorised by Lavenex & Uçarer, but it could be an inevitable outcome of the increased 
integration into the internal market. 
We initially expected that sub-Saharan immigrants were affected by a combined policy on 
immigration and human rights, why we analysed the immigration policy together with policies 
on human rights. We have found that this is not the case. Immigration policy of the European 
Union is mainly about securing the borders, and we intended to investigate whether this 
securitisation of borders also applies to the Moroccan immigration policies, as there has been an 
Europeanisation of the Moroccan policies. Morocco did not have a policy on immigration before 
2003 and when they made a policy it was very much dominated by security issues comparable to 
the EU approach. Regarding policies of human rights they mostly apply to Moroccans and norms 
of human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants is very limited. From this point of view, the EU has 
been successful in influencing the immigration policy in Morocco because it has become 
securitised in the same way as the EU, and the EU has thus gained an ally in the fight against 
illegal immigration.  
However, regarding human rights, the EU has been far less capable of making Morocco 
implement the desired policies, which is probably a result of the absence of requirements on the 
part of the EU. With the current framework of the ENP the EU prioritise cooperation over 
conditionality, why they do not put pressure on Morocco to implement the same values of human 
rights. Instead, the EU attempts to influence Morocco through dialogue and cooperation rather 
than making human rights a requirement for agreements. The EU never succeeded in pressuring 
the power structures of Morocco in this area, as they do not pose financial rewards or sanctions 
for human rights of sub-Saharan immigrants, the same way as they implement e.g. economic 
reforms. Despite this lack of conditionality regarding human rights, Morocco has implemented 
policies that have improved the social conditions in the country especially for women and the 
poor. But these policies are directed at Moroccan citizens, which has arguably led to increased 
inequality between immigrants and Moroccans and we can see that there is tension between the 
groups through reports of racism and violence. 
There is a big disparity between the European Union’s effort to limit immigration and its effort 
to help immigrants affected by security policy. The situation has arguably become worse for the 
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sub-Saharan immigrants as a result of securitisation and search for stability in neighbouring 
countries through economic reforms. Thus, there is a discrepancy between the rhetorical identity 
of the European Union, with its focus on democratisation and respect for human rights, and its 
actual actions in regard to securing and implementing norms of human rights in associated 
countries. We would argue, that this discrepancy pose a possible legitimacy problem for the 
European Union. Therefore we conclude, that even though the Moroccan policies have been 
Europeanised and the identity of the EU is partly based on respect for human rights, the 
Europeanisation of Morocco has not resulted in policy securing human rights of sub-Saharan 
immigrants in Morocco. 
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Changes in Moroccan 
immigration law after 2003 
change 
International migration, 
remittances and development: 
myths and facts, Third World 
Quarterly, 26:8, 1269­1284,  2005 
Discussion paper about 
migration 
Morocco: the political and 
social dimension of migration  2007 
Moroccan policies on 
immigration 
Countries at Crossroads: 
Morocco  2011  Profile of Morocco 
The political economy of 
growth in Morocco  2006 
Economic and political 
characteristics of Morocco at 
a glance 
Estimation of a simultaneous 
equations model 
of macroeconomic variables 
in Morocco  2014 
Macroeconomic evolution of 
Morocco under several 
perspectives 
African Economic Outlook: 
Morocco 2014  2014 
Moroccan perspective on 
reforms and economic 
evolution in 2014  
 
EU documents about EU­Morocco relations 
Material  Date  Main objectives 
EU­Morocco Association 
Agreement  18/03/2000 
Association between the 
Kingdom of Morocco and the 
European Community, as 
well as its Member States. 
Increase dialogue and 
cooperation at a political and 
institutional level in many 
different fields (welfare, 
scientific research, 
international trade etc.) 
ENP Country Report  12/05/2004 
Evaluation of bilateral 
relations between Morocco 
and European Union 
National Indicative 
Programme, 2005­2006  29/06/2004 
Guidelines for the Moroccan 
overall development during 
the given period 
EU­Morocco ENP Action 
Plan  2006 
Development of the strategy 
of implementation of 
European Neighbourhood 
Policy 
2006 ­Progress Report on the 
Implementation of ENP  4/12/2006 
Assessment of European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
implementation 
Morocco Strategy Paper 
2007­2013  2007 
Strategy plan for European 
Community aid between 
2007 and 2013 
Morocco: National Indicative 
Programme 2007­2010  2007 
Identification of Moroccan 
programmes to be financed 
by ENP Instrument 
Action Fiche for Morocco  2007 
Support for type creation of 
educational strategy 
2007 ­ Morocco. Commission 
Approval of ENP Annual 
Action Programme (2007)  2007 
Approval of ENP Annual 
plan for 2007 
2007 ­ Progress Report on the 
Implementation of the ENP  3/04/2008 
Assessment of European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
implementation 
Advanced Status  2008 
Joint EU­Morocco document 
on the strengthening of 
bilateral relations 
Action Fiche for Morocco  2008 
Support to INDH (National 
Initiative for Human 
Development) 
Morocco. Commission 
Approval of ENP Annual 
Action Programme (2008)  2008 
Commission approval of 
Action Plan in 2008 and 2009 
2008­ Progress Report on the 
Implementation of ENP  23/04/2009 
Assessment of European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
implementation 
Action Fiche for Morocco  2009  Support for several project 
2009­ Progress Report  12/05/2010 
Assessment of European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
implementation 
2010 ­ How you achieve 
progress on EU­Morocco 
Advanced Status  1/03/2010 
Reflections on EU­Morocco 
Advanced status 
Action Fiche for Morocco  2010  Support for several projects 
2010 ­ Morocco. Commission 
Decision Amending Decision 
Approving ENP Annual 
Action Programme  7/09/2010 
Replacement of NHDI Action 
fiche with another Action 
Fiche 
2007­ Morocco. Commission 
Decision Amending Decision 
Approving ENP Annual 
Action Programme  9/08/2010 
Replacement of NHDI Action 
fiche with another Action 
Fiche 
2010 ­ CARIM Migration 
Profile. Morocco  1/11/2010  Working paper on Morocco 
2010­ Progress Report on 
Implementation of ENP  2011 
Assessment of European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
implementation 
Mid­Term Review of the 
Country Strategy Paper 
Morocco 2007­2013 and 
National Indicative Program 
2011­2013  2011 
Evaluation of Country 
Strategy Paper and Plan 
2011­2013 
2011 ­ Progress Report on the 
Implementation of the ENP  15/05/2012 
Assessment of European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
implementation 
2011 ­ ENP Memo  15/05/2012 
Monitoring report of ENP 
2011 
2012­ Progress Report on the 
Implementation of ENP  20/03/2013 
Assessment of European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
implementation 
2012 ENP Memo  20/03/2013 
Monitoring report of ENP 
2012 
Mobility Partnership  25/03/2013 
Agreement regarding 
mobility of EU and Moroccan 
citizens. 
2013 ­ Council decision on 
Action Plan 2013­2017.  17/04/2013 
Council decision and 
recommendation on 
EU­Morocco action 
2013 ­ Action Plan 
(2013­2017)  9/12/2013 
Recommendation for 
actuation of Action Plan 
2013 ­ CARIM Migration 
Profile. Morocco.  1/07/2013  Working paper on Morocco 
2013­Morocco. ENP Progress 
Report  27/03/2014 
Assessment of European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
implementation 
2013 ENP Memo  27/03/2014  Monitoring report ENP 2013 
 
NGOs reporting on sub­Saharan immigrants in Morocco 
Material  Date  Main objectives 
Amnesty International:  Spain 
and Morocco ­ Failure to 
protect the rights of 
immigrants. One year on.  26/10/2006 
Report on the role of the 
Spain and Country regarding 
the human rights of 
immigrants 
The Human Rights of 
Sub­Saharan Migrants in 
Morocco (GADEM for 
Justice Without Borders)  2010  Report on human rights 
Human Rights Watch: 
Abusados y Expulsados  2014 
Report on living condition of 
immigrants 
Amnesty International: The 
human cost of Fortress 
Europe.  2014 
Report on sub­Saharan 
immigrants coming in Europe 
 
Articles 
Material  Date [Accessed]  Main objectives 
ABC  24/05/2015 
Spain­ Moroccan joint efforts 
over terrorism 
Al Arabiya  24/05/2015 
Morocco­ France Diplomatic 
row 
aljazeera, African migrants 
storm the Spain­Morocco 
border  24/05/2015 
Article on the the attempt of 
migrants to cross from 
Morocco into Spain 
BBC Mundo  24/05/2015  Protests in Morocco 
BBC ­ Morocco 
Profile:Leaders  24/05/2015 
Profile of King Mohammed 
6th 
DR, EU's foreløbige plan  23/05/2015  10 ways to stop illegal 
immigration in EU 
EEAS, The EU and Human 
Rights  24/05/2015 
The EU's view on human 
rights 
The European Union’s 
Neighbourhood Policy in 
Morocco and Azerbaijan  24/05/2015 
Description of ENP Strategy 
in Morocco and Azeirbaijan 
El Pais  24/05/2015 
Spain­ Moroccan cooperation 
extension 
El Pais Archives  24/05/2015  Riots in Morocco 
El Pais International  24/05/2015 
Obama­ Morocco relationship 
in Moroccan autonomy plan 
euobserver, EU faces tough 
choices in the neighbourhood  18/05/2015 
Opinion on the failings of the 
ENP and the need to reform it 
Forbes  24/05/2015  US interest in Morocco 
FP, Morocco's Islamist Prime 
Minister  24/05/2015 
Newly elected Prime Minister 
in Morocco 
The Guardian  24/05/2015 
Mass drowning disaster in the 
Mediterranean 
 
